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## WEST EUROPE REPORT

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## USE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS OVERSEAS DISCUSSED

Paris STRATEGIE ET DEFENSE in French Jan 82 p 35

[Editorial: "Towards Possible Deployment of Tactical Nuclear Forces Overseas"]

[Text] On 21 March 1977, on the occasion of a conference at the IHEDN [Institute for Advanced Studies of National Defense], General Mery, armed-forces chief of staff, raised the problem of the use of tactical nuclear weapons outside Europe; he stated: "At this time, we are only at the stage of general-staff consideration." Remarking that in the case of use at sea, tactical nuclear weapons "lose their apocalyptic character," he envisioned two cases. One is "based on a sea bordering the European continent." In this hypothesis, tactical use would be linked to strategic use, as in Europe itself. The other case "would be that of a distant maritime theater--the Indian Ocean, for example." It would then be "a new concept," since it "could involve using tactical weapons while avoiding unleashing the strategic forces in various types of action of the intimidation or reprisal type." It is still not known whether, since 1977, the general staff has completed its thinking on the subject and whether a concept of coherent use of tactical nuclear weapons overseas has been arrived at. If such be the case, the country should be informed of it. The well-known avatars of the evolutive concept of use of ANT [tactical nuclear weapons] on land could have served as useful instruction. Once again, it appears that the establishment of a new class of weaponry is preceding its doctrine of use. For what one is in effect sure of is that some 10 Super-Etendards, based on our 2 aircraft carriers, are going to be carrying tactical nuclear weapons. One waits for the French general staff to specify the conditions of their possible use.

Today, the use of maritime ANT linked to strategic weapons is envisionable only on the hypothesis of a "naval test."

The use of maritime ANT connected with the Strategic Nuclear Force would mean imminent triggering of massive reprisals in case of persistence of the attack. It is therefore really credible only on the hypothesis of a major maritime aggression directed against the national territory. The most effective tactical weapon remains the "conventional" fission-type nuclear weapon, capable of devastating the superstructures of ships by its blast effects.

Tomorrow, France may be led to use, or threaten to use, the overseas ANT without any connection with the strategic forces.

Against a nuclear superpower, the overseas ANT would not be deterrent. Reduced to its military effectiveness alone, since it would be disconnected from the FNS [Strategic Nuclear Forces], it would run up against the disproportion of the forces involved: without the backup of the threat of strategic reprisals, the weak can no longer intimidate the strong. If the Soviets were to close the Persian Gulf themselves, France would have no means of opposing the action.

According to General Mery's remarks in 1977, it would be a matter of defending our strategic supply routes, of establishing our influence in a specific zone and of restoring to France the means of ensuring respect for its flag in the face of the emergence of regional powers. On these hypotheses, the tactical nuclear weapons carried on board could be used without being the immediate prelude to unleashing of the strategic forces. Localized reprisal or intimidation actions, disconnected from the FNS, would be involved.

The emergence, in the medium and long terms, of regional powers possessing nuclear weapons will not fail to counter, to one degree or another, the French influence in the zones far-removed from our territory. The very essence of the indirect strategy developed by the big powers will be called into question, with consequences that today are difficult to imagine.

The political and strategic factors that make a country prepared to take the military nuclear step become certainly, or even probably, a nuclear power have been pointed out in 11 Third World countries: South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Pakistan and Taiwan. With the exception of Libya, all these countries could provide themselves with tactical nuclear weaponry within a time period ranging from a few days for Israel to a few months for South Africa and India and 6 or 7 years for Egypt. In the long term, some 30 countries will possess the installations and know-how necessary for fabricating nuclear weapons. In a general way, the necessarily rudimentary nuclear arsenal of the Third World countries will not enable them to launch a second attack or cope with a critical situation. They will not have early-warning facilities, information networks, "red telephones," etc.

In a Third World where "proliferation" has started, the big powers--and one may refer to the Soviet Union in particular--could then be tempted to entrust tactical nuclear weapons to certain of their privileged allies with a view to re-establishing threatened regional balances to their advantage.

Whatever the relations maintained by France with these countries may be today, its interests may be threatened one day--in Guyana by Brazil, in the Mediterranean basin by Libya, in the Near East by Iraq, in Djibouti by Ethiopia and Yemen. Either alone or in concert with its allies, France could be led to act in a Third World in which the relationship of conventional military forces would be totally upset by the nuclear fact.

--Against a new nuclear power not possessing strategic carriers, France could be led to have to use its tactical nuclear armament.

--Against a nonnuclear power, France's use of ANT could be justified only by an imbalance of the conventional forces involved. But such substitution of the atom for "conventional" means could have the consequence of making France an outlaw among the nations.

--In both cases, France would expose itself, in the case of a solitary initiative, to the possibility of its adversary's calling on the protection of a superpower. The superpower could then furnish to the "victim of aggression" tactical nuclear weaponry that could counterbalance--or go beyond--our own armament.

--A declaration by France of a concept of use of unconnected maritime ANT therefore entails uncertainties and serious risks.

Nevertheless, nuclear proliferation in the Third World appears ineluctable in the next 15 years. Since the "sanctuaries" of the nuclear powers that have central systems will not be in the game, the spread of the nuclear risk to external theaters will be considerably increased. From this perspective only, mastery by France of the technology of enhanced-radiation weapons and medium-term production of them could constitute a response relatively well-suited to the context of their possible use.

Since the "terrifying" aspects (blast and heat) and the "visual" aspects of this weaponry are very minimal as compared with those of conventional tactical nuclear weaponry, the international reactions could be attenuated, though its effects would be no less significant to the adversary. The ambiguous and hybrid character that this weaponry can have in the eyes of international observers will doubtlessly make it necessary in certain types of external intervention outside Europe.

11267

CSO: 3100/430

## MINISTER DEFENDS SAUDI OIL CONTRACT, ASKS EXPANSION OF DONG

## Paper Against State Firm Expansion

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 16 Mar 82 p 8

[Editorial]

[Text] The state Danish Oil and Natural Gas Company, DONG, is trying once more to expand its activity. This is to be done through the establishment of a subsidiary company to engage in oil exploration in the Danish area. In the long run this could also involve using the company to extract and refine oil. In this connection the energy minister has asked the Finance Committee for 32 million kroner for the necessary expansion of DONG's stock capital.

The Finance Committee should reject this request. There is no information suggesting that the country would have any socioeconomic or energy interest in the implementation of such a further expansion of DONG. Approval of a state involvement of this kind would represent far-reaching and fundamental problems and implementation should not really be possible as a result of a vote by the Folketing Finance Committee.

In addition, it must be regarded as close to a provocation on the part of the energy minister if such a project is pushed through before the promised clear rules have been created for public supervision of DONG's activities. It is understandable that the Radical Liberals also seem to be maintaining that under any circumstances these DONG problems must be solved first.

All in all the control of DONG is a topic that should be discussed thoroughly. It will hardly be satisfactory simply to set up a DONG stockholders' committee with members appointed by the political parties represented in Folketing. That kind of set-up is unlikely to provide the needed public supervision and political control. On the whole, experiences in other areas with bodies of this kind are not good. The participating politicians can easily act as a kind of lobby for the firm in question, when the need was for them to function as the critical representatives of the public. Nor would it be an adequate solution to the problem of control if DONG merely promised to submit annual reports to Folketing on its activities and plans.



The DONG apparatus in itself contains a dynamic force and drive toward expansion for its own sake that should be checked by far more detailed control regulations. After all, this is an enterprise acting solely on the basis of public funds. Therefore, DONG should be forced to follow rules similar to those applying to other state enterprises, such as DSB [Danish State Railways] and P & T [Danish Post and Telegraph Service]. No one would claim that these rules are ideal or that they work without problems. But they would still be the best chance for a solution that would keep the imperialistic tendencies of DONG under control.

#### Minister Asks Greater State Control

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 18 Mar 82 p 5

[Article by Dan Axel]

[Text] Before long, Energy Minister Poul Nielson will take steps that will give Folketing and the municipal natural gas companies more supervision and control over DONG, Inc. BERLINGSKE TIDENDE has learned that this will mean a greater refurbishment of the DONG board of directors.

This will probably involve establishing a stockholders' committee that will elect two political observers to the board of directors--and the appointment of two representatives from the joint municipal gas company, Komgas. To keep the board from becoming too swollen, several of the present DONG board members will probably have to leave their posts.

But steps must be taken soon. Yesterday a majority of the Finance Committee refused to appropriate 32 million kroner for the formation of a DONG subsidiary for the preparation of state involvement in North Sea oil drilling.

Lars P. Gammelgaard (K [Conservative]) said after yesterday's committee meeting that if the Finance Committee had not rejected the request he would have brought it up before Folketing. The Conservatives feel the extraction of oil and gas should be done not by the state but by private firms that already have the necessary expertise.

#### Folketing Hesitant to Grant Request

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 18 Mar 82 p 5

[Text] A Folketing majority is hesitant and somewhat doubtful at the moment about Energy Minister Poul Nielson's wish to expand the natural gas project to include central and northern Jutland. At any rate there are still a number of unclarified questions that must now be discussed in more detail by the Folketing Energy Committee.



In Folketing yesterday the minister's proposal received most support from the Social Democrats and the left-wing parties with the other parties expressing reservations in varying degrees. Annelise Gotfredsen (K), for instance, thought it preferable to limit the project as much as possible.

Ivar Hansen (V [Liberal]) doubted this was the right time to expand the project and he gave various prerequisites that would have to be met before he could support the proposal. Emmert Andersen (CD [Center-Democrat]) felt it would be better to sell surplus gas abroad and Lone Dybkjaer (R [Radical Liberal]) asked for more detailed clarification of the plan's economic feasibility. Ole Maisted (FRP [Progressive]) categorically rejected expanding a project that already looked as if it would produce massive deficits.

#### Saudi Contracts Defended

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 19 Mar 82 p 1

[Article by Dan Axel]

[Text] A number of European countries have canceled state oil purchase contracts because suddenly it was possible to buy oil much more cheaply in other ways. But Denmark will not seek to cancel the Saudi Arabian contract--known as the crystal-clear contract--which expires at the end of 1982 and commits us to buy 20 [as published] barrels of oil a day.

It appears from a reply by Energy Minister Poul Nielson that Sweden has canceled a contract for 40,000 barrels a day--a contract there had been plans to double. Italy has cut in half its contract for 200,000 barrels, France is seeking to reduce contracts for a total of 300,000 barrels and Belgium is trying to withdraw entirely from a contract for 100,000 barrels a day.

The figures come from the international oil press, wrote Poul Nielson, who stressed that he has no special knowledge concerning the current plans of other countries in the oil trade sector.

Poul Nielson is not so sure oil prices will continue to decline. In the reply to Folketing he said among other things: "The present situation on the international oil market can change quickly." He pointed out that the OPEC countries are holding a meeting tomorrow in reference to the current situation.

6578

CSO: 3106/84

## EXPERTS CALL ALGERIAN GAS DEAL 'CATASTROPHIC'

Paris LE POINT in French 8-14 Feb 82 p 47

[Text] Definitely, gas contracts follow each other, but do not resemble each other. It is said that the Soviet contract is supposed to be economically good and politically bad, and that the Franco-Algerian contract is politically good and economically bad. Bad? Some experts--and important ones--dare call it catastrophic.

For over 2 years now, SONATRACH [National Company for the Transport and Marketing of Hydrocarbons], an Algerian oil company, has been attempting to modify the financial clauses in three contracts for delivery of liquefied natural gas to France.

Since 1980, the French Gas Company has been rejecting the supplier's claims, both with regard to prices and their indexing on crude oil.

At the end of last December--after Francois Mitterand's trip to Algeria -- Pierre Alby, president of the French Gas Company, and Pierre Delaporte, general manager, were called to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Resume contact with SONATRACH in January. Try to conclude before the end of the month," Claude Cheysson, [Minister of Foreign Affairs], asked of them in essence.

Therefore, negotiations resumed in January. The French Gas Company tried hard to win on several points here and there. Unfortunately, the seller did not give in.

The agreement was signed on Tuesday night. Differently from the Franco-Soviet contract, this agreement was commented on extensively by the new government, regarding it as "exemplary." Actually, it guarantees delivery of 9.15 billion cubic meters a year to France starting in 1983.

At what price? There is the rub. Five dollars a million BTU (international unit of measurement), that is to say \$6 after regasification in France. Considerably more than the too famous Franco-Soviet contract. More also, in spite of what Claude Cheysson says--sent hastily twice to unfreeze the deal--than most of the gas contracts (long-range ones, of course) signed in the West.

The excess cost is, after all, so obvious that the state's budget is taking over part of it: 13.5 percent of the price, to be transferred directly to

SONATRACH. And, nevertheless, within the French Gas Company, there is grumbling that, even "eased" in that way, Algerian gas will reach France still more costly than the average of other deliveries.

Moreover, an indexing clause ties the price of that gas to a "basket" of barrels in the single direction of an increase! No reduction if oil goes down in price.

There are some industrial compensations. Official statements on France's part bear witness to this. But "the agreement is strictly commercial," Algeria Press Service seems to reply. "Therefore, it does not tie Algeria to any other commitment than to deliver natural gas to France."

The moral aspect remains. Is this agreement a first disinterested step by the rich north toward the poor south? This is not sure. It might have been, perhaps, if it had paid more amply for cacao, coffee, copper, sugarcane, in short the only resources that the real Third World is trying to negotiate in some way or another, for want of oil or gas. But, unfortunately, it is methane, therefore already expensive energy (its price has increased six-fold in 10 years), that France is going to contribute to make more expensive. What advantages will the poor countries derive from it?

If there are some who are giving this a poor welcome, it is the Europeans, starting with the Italians. They negotiated, in fact, with the Algerians and already found their gas 20 percent too expensive. Now, they are bound to see the bidding go up still more.

Even in France, a number of specialists are claiming in consternation: "All the future suppliers," they say, "that is to say the West African countries, are going to demand similar terms of their future customers. This contract has not stopped costing us dearly."

10,042

CSO: 3100/362

## PORT ACTIVITY DEVELOPED FAVORABLY IN 1981

Brussels LA LIBRE BELGIQUE in French 6,7 Feb 82 p 14

[Article by Jacques Rom: "Belgian Seaports Doing Better than Holding Their Own"]

[Text] Compared to the noticeable regression experienced by the major European maritime centers, the large Belgian seaports are in a very decent position. In spite of the net weakening of the Belgian industrial and economic fabric, the port of Ghent has sharply increased its traffic, Antwerp has practically remained steady, and only Zeebrugge is experiencing some decline. Nevertheless, a certain optimism is being displayed in the three ports, specifically because of the notable improvements which have been made in the facilities and which should start to bear fruit in 1983.

Thus, in Antwerp there will be, on the right bank, the contribution made by the new Delwaide basin and, on the left bank, the progressive putting into service of the completely pre-fabricated port by Kallo. In Ghent, several significant improvements will become operational in 1982 and it is expected that their results will have a positive impact on developments in 1983. Zeebrugge will see its new sea lock put into operation.

In 1981, Antwerp posted approximately 80 million tons (the final figures are not yet known) in goods traffic; that is a 2.4 percent drop compared to the record figures for 1980.

Ghent reached its absolute traffic record with 19,320,000 tons; that is an increase of about 5 percent, which will enable it to strengthen its position among the European ports.

On the other hand, in overall figures Zeebrugge is experiencing a sharp regression: 9.5 percent. It handled only 12,841,122 tons in 1981 as against 14,189,482 tons in 1980.

The port of Ostend was not exempt from the recession which characterizes the short sea sector as a whole. Its decline touches both the activities of the Maritime Transportation Agency and those developed in the municipal docks.

True, the phenomenon is a general one in Western Europe where the drop in traffic usually fluctuates between 8 and 11 percent. Here, for information only, are the latest statistics relating to the noted decline of a few large maritime centers: Hamburg, 4 percent; Le Havre, 7 percent; Marseilles, 9 percent; Rotterdam, 11 percent and Dunkerque, 12 percent.

By adding together the overall activities of the three large Belgian seaports, it will be noted that, together, they handled 112 million tons in 1981 as against 114 million tons in 1980. These changes show a drop of less than 2 percent!

#### Antwerp Still Very Independent

If the liabilities for the operation of Antwerp in 1982 are estimated at 865 million francs -- or 50 million francs more than in 1981 --, some stabilization has been noted, however. The port activities are only fifth on the city's list of items in the red, and currently follow the losses recorded by education, the police department, debt service and... the arts. In this respect, it should also be noted that the state has always adopted a different approach toward Antwerp than it has toward Ghent (where the canal is dredged at state cost) and Zeebrugge, where state interventions are plentiful.

Be that as it may, port Alderman M.J. Huyghebaert is firmly determined to operate severe cuts and to rationalize wherever possible. Thus, a series of dry docks (municipal property) will no longer be used for maritime navigation and the operation of the cranes will be given a new impetus through the replacement of the old lifting apparatus. The management of the grain elevators will be the object of a technical and market study. Finally, since its recent entry into service, the impressive floating crane "Brabo" has already brought in 2 million francs.

The large projects in Antwerp are experiencing an (inevitable) stagnation. However, it is important that final decisions be made in the more or less short term. Thus, before the end of 1984 the fate of the lock and the canal of Baalhoek, structures which are part of the Belgo-Dutch Scheldt-Meuse draft treaties, should be decided on. As of 1983, ships are expected on the left bank of Antwerp and as of that time we will have to proceed with technical developments. The latter would be completely different if the planned bilateral enterprise (the cost of which would be approximately 25 billion Belgian francs) were to be abandoned in the end. If it were nevertheless retained, then it would not be possible to put it into service prior to... 1995!

A decision is also expected with regard to the straightening of the Bath bend, a job estimated at 15 billion francs. Antwerp is the petitioner concerning the construction of the "Liefkenshoek" tunnel, which should provide a road and rail-road link between the two banks of the river; it is not in terms of the construction of a storm dam on the Scheldt. This project, which is currently being studied at various (Belgian) universities, would be virtually as high as the cathedral tower and it would cost on the order of 25 billion francs! Antwerp is satisfied with the current protection wall, but this dam would not prevent the Scheldt from overflowing, if need be, upstream and downstream from the city...



Navigation on the river continues to improve regularly, thanks to intensive dredging operations (108 seagoing ships with an average tonnage of more than 118,000 tons were accommodated in 1981) and it is anticipated that the radar system will be expanded shortly. The Berendrecht lock, which will double the capacity of the Zandvliet one and will become the largest in the world, should be completed in 1986 at the latest.

On the left bank, we should note the decision to invest close to 3 billion francs in the storage of gas (LPG [Liquified Petroleum Gas]) over an area of close to 28 hectares. On the right bank, work on the future Delwaide basin has reached its final stage and the structure will be officially inaugurated next November.

Antwerp continues to play a primary role in our regional as well as our national economy. Thus 71 percent of the maritime traffic of goods using Belgian ports, 87 percent of the traffic of national domestic navigation, and 44 percent of this same traffic at the international level, pass through Antwerp. As far as railroad traffic is concerned, Antwerp accommodates 71 percent of the domestic traffic (in goods) and 30 percent of the overall movement.

Furthermore, it is interesting to know that of all the goods handled in Antwerp, 40 percent comes from transit, 20 percent is due to local traffic, 20 percent comes from other parts of Flanders, from Brussels and from the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, while 20 percent comes from Wallonia. The breakdown of the latter movement, pertaining to 15.6 million tons, is as follows: 9.5 million tons of ore, 1 million tons of solid fuels, 1.8 million tons of iron and steel, and 3.3 million tons of various goods, such as chemical products, construction materials, petroleum products and non-ferrous materials.

Thus, Antwerp remains, strategically and economically, centered around Wallonia and... vice versa.

Ghent, Winner of Pool...

The port of Ghent, for its part, has strengthened its position at the heart of the large European maritime centers. The new traffic it has been able to inaugurate largely compensates for the losses of traditional traffic.

And while in 1981 this traffic exceeded 19 million tons, this movement had not yet reached 3 million tons in 1968! Thus, the rapid development and expansion of the port of Ghent should be particularly spotlighted. Consequently, the demands made by the mayor and port alderman, Mr P. de Paepe, concerning a division or, for lack of it, a noticeable improvement of the Ghent-Terneuzen canal, are more understandable. And this is all the more so as ships loaded with imported cars experience enormous difficulties in getting through the Dutch lock built along the Scheldt and opening the road to and from the port of Ghent.

The Ghent town councillors attribute the success, and also the dynamism of their port and maritime policy to the close cooperation which has been achieved with the private sector. The trend is clearly rising in terms of grain imports and exports, as well as of goods in general. The decline registered in other traditional traffic could be attributed to the international economic crisis.

The given regressions affect the sectors of timber, petroleum products, coal, and fertilizers, as well as the area of iron and steel.

Moreover, a favorable development in the transportation of animals -- specifically, the importation of horses from the USSR and the exportation of Belgian cattle for slaughter to the Third World countries -- has been noted. In 1981, no less than 17,400 head of cattle were "handled" this way by the port of Ghent.

Another positive element: the increased use of the dry docks. The diversification of traffic continues and it has formed the basis for numerous new investments.

While about 40 projects were carried out successfully over the last few years, others are currently being studied. Thus, it is expected that a distribution center for frozen fruit juices at the Sifrer basin and a coal terminal on the land which has just been acquired near Kennedy Avenue, will be put into service yet this year.

Zeebrugge Waiting...

Zeebrugge, on the other hand, has experienced a decline of nearly 10 percent compared to last year. This regression is due to the traffic of crude petroleum products (a drop of 790,000 tons or 17.43 percent), of refined petroleum products (176,000 tons or 19.70 percent), of building materials (427,000 tons or 23.98 percent) and of the Ro/Ro [Roll on/Roll off] movement (8.78 percent). On the other hand, and this partially compensates for the above, a 22 percent increase in the container traffic, and an 8.43 percent increase in the "ferry" sector were noted, while the movement of passengers -- more than 2.3 million individuals -- is maintaining itself.

Specifically because of the bad position of the Belgian franc with regard to the pound sterling, the volume of exports of goods to Great Britain has notably gone down (minus 9.57 percent bound for Felixstowe and minus 17.57 percent bound for Dover). These reductions are respectively only minus 5.91 percent and minus 3.47 percent at entry. This phenomenon has also reversed the movement of travelers who are currently coming in increasing numbers to the continent...

On the other hand, the service of goods and passengers provided by the North Sea Ferries, between Zeebrugge and Hull, is noticeably progressing with percentages reaching nearly as high as 24 percent! This upsurge of traffic to the northern part of Great Britain has even prompted this fleet shortly to put a third unit, of large dimensions, into service as soon as it can be established at its new location by the old jetty.

Getting back to the link with Dover and Felixstowe, the Townsend Car Ferries have registered a sharp decline due to the competitive struggle currently being waged, with some fierceness, in that part of the North Sea. If the reduction of passengers (and tourist cars) reaches 32 percent, the responsibility for this is shifted, on the one hand, onto the port of Calais which provides the same crossing in minimum time and with spacious and modern boats, and, on the other hand, onto the active competition of the Maritime Transportation Agency,



the state fleet, in Ostend. The latter pays neither port duties, nor piloting charges, nor navigation fees, while in Zeebrugge those same taxes are high. Thus, the piloting fees have again been increased by 110 percent since 1981, even though not a single pilot is ever used! These are the kinds of situations which are found only in Belgium...

In other respects, the president of the maritime installations in Zeebrugge, M.F. Traen, could rejoice about the constant growth of transit traffic; however, he deplores the weakening of Belgium's export power, at least in the area of supplies to the countries overseas.

Nevertheless, Zeebrugge has scored two new record figures. The first involves the potato trade (108,000 tons and a greater than 81 percent increase), the second concerns grains and totals 118,000 tons. Another big reason for satisfaction: the contract which has just been signed for the delivery of 5000,000 tons of coke between Dover and Zeebrugge. These quick service deliveries will be spread over 2 years and carried out by means of... containers!

The leaders of the MBZ [expansion unknown] attribute the certain decline of Zeebrugge to the reduced dimensions which it was given 75 years ago. They hope that a new expansion will be possible as of 1 September 1983, the anticipated date for the putting into service of the new sea lock. They believe that the activating and development of this structure, of its quays and of the neighboring land should favor the arrival of new traffic and of additional industrial establishments.

Finally, it is noted in Ostend that in spite of its relatively advantageous price, the Ostend-Dover link by jetfoil, inaugurated last May, did not meet with the anticipated success, as the rate of occupancy barely exceeds 35 percent!

Options have been taken to increase the capacity of transportation to Dover in the course of the year. Specifically, through the chartering of the Swedish freight ship "Stena Normandia" and the putting into service of an additional unit by the Schiaffino fleet. On the other hand, the project for an Ostend-Immingham line was abandoned for budgetary reasons. The construction of the contemplated Ro/Ro ship would have cost 1 billion Belgian francs, which the government cannot consider under the present circumstances.

And there always remains the threatening prospect of a possible road and/or railroad tunnel, to be built under the Channel. But this would not seem to be for tomorrow...

8463

CSO: 3100/334

## GOL ON TAX RISES, UNEMPLOYMENT, ROLE OF EMPLOYERS

Brussels LE SOIR in French 11 Mar 82 p 2

[Interview by Janine Claeys, Guy Depas and Catherine Ferrant with Minister of Justice and Institutional Reform Jean Gol: "A Minimum of Charges, a Wager on Confidence: 'Everyone Must Do His Part,' Says Jean Gol"; date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] The liberals had declared, before they went into the government, that they would not tolerate any new taxes. Today, a series of taxes, of contributions, is announced. Is this logical? And first of all, does the 10-percent contribution demanded from persons earning more than 3 million seem judicious to you?

[Answer] The government has unanimously considered that it was necessary to take a measure affecting the highest incomes, at a time when sacrifices are being asked of all the population. We are only applying to all persons concerned --there are 10,200 in Belgium--the measure taken with regard to the ministers, who are thus seeing 10 percent of their income cut off. Three million a year--that is about what a Parliamentary minister earns.

## Neither Conquerors Nor Conquered

[Question] Wouldn't the Social-Christians have liked to put the line lower? You have won on this arrangement.

[Answer] I refuse to speak in terms of victory or defeat. It is a levy that seems justified to me and that does not affect the profitability of the enterprises.

[Question] But there is not only that tax. What is one to think of the 1-franc tax on gasoline, the withdrawal of a part of the family allowances?

[Answer] Of the 125 billion that we had to save at the outset, I defy you to find more than 15 or at most 20 billion in new charges. For the rest, it involves withdrawal of advantages, which is not the same thing. The new charges are the contribution that we spoke of, the franc on gasoline, and some 10 billion from social security. In accordance with modalities to be decided on, for I remind you that we want to hear the point of view of the social interlocutors and that we are prepared to study alternatives. So long as one sticks to the

budgetary objectives defined. But note carefully! If someone were to tell us it was necessary to decide on 40 billion in additional contributions and not make economies, there would be a major political problem.

The 500 francs levied on family allowances does not in itself represent a new charge but is rather the withdrawal of an advantage, nothing more.

What seems important to me is the unprecedented economizing effort that we have undertaken. The magnitude of these economies will be judged when the concrete measures that derive from them are seen.

The Crisis Is to Blame

[Question] As regards unemployment, in particular...

[Answer] These economies are going to raise an outcry. But a society in crisis has to make an austerity effort, as compared with what was done in a society in full growth. I stress the fact that we are protecting the most disadvantaged, notably by maintaining complete indexing of social allowances. And see where we are coming from. It is a matter of saving 100 billion over 9 months, and in some cases over a shorter time, since certain measures--in the national education sector, for example--cannot be taken until the school year begins in September. If we had been able to apply our decisions over a full year, we would practically reach the 200-billion deficit recommended by the European Commission. In many areas, the special powers give us an extra half-year. Public opinion will recognize that this is not the fault of the government, still less of the liberals.

[Question] But indeed of the Socialists?

[Answer] It is the fault of the political crisis and of the absence of political power since July. The budget that came out at the beginning of August 1981 was largely faked. It provided for no true economies. Then came the crisis. Then the special powers. And the government will submit its budget before the end of March. It will have to do two in 1 year.

We have discovered skeletons in the closet. An example? None of the economy measures decided on in August for French national education has been implemented. The increases in public rates decided on have not even been prepared.

[Question] The deficit will therefore reach 252 billion. But the net balance to be financed this year will reach 450 billion. Credit becomes difficult to obtain abroad.

[Answer] Which demonstrates that drastic measures were indispensable.

[Question] And how to finance all that? Forced lending? Appeal to capital after a tax amnesty?

## Making Profits Again and Then Exporting Them

[Answer] We liberals remain convinced of the utility, let us say, of the reinvestment in Belgian enterprises of sums whose origins would not be disclosed. But what we have done was essential for our brand image in the international markets.

The coherence of the government's approach has to be marked to its credit. It has striven to establish the elements of confidence: stimulation of activity by reduction of costs, realistic monetary policy, budgetary austerity. It is now up to the others to play this bet on confidence.

[Question] Is it up to the employers to play it?

[Answer] I sometimes have the impression that these people--and especially the organized employers, who have to stop their constant complaining--are not aware that they have to do their job too. In this regard, the trade unions are right: everyone must do his part. If everything we have decided on contributed to the companies' making profits again and then exporting them, it would be contrary to what we have wanted to achieve. And the public would long for other remedies, which would not correspond to a liberal economy.

[Question] Watch out for your friends.

[Answer] We are not, as is said, "friends of the employers." We have confidence in the market economy because no other system has demonstrated its effectiveness. But we refuse to see our action undermined by those who call themselves the greatest defenders of the liberal economy. Nor will we defend an employer world that does not play its part.

With this said, it is clear that if the image that the country, and especially Wallonia, gives abroad, and notably because of the strikes, does not become a good one again, we will have destroyed one of the ways of restoring confidence.

11267

CSO: 3100/443

## CHRISTIAN TRADE UNIONS REJECT GOVERNMENT PROGRAM

Brussels LE SOIR in French 12 Mar 82 p 2

[Article by J. Cl.: "The CSC (Confederation of Christian Trade Unions) Says 'No' to the Martens V Plan But Refuses to Be Pulled Along by the FGTB (General Federation of Labor of Belgium)"]

[Text] The social panorama was overturned during the night of Tuesday-Wednesday: for the first time, after a long meeting (from 6 pm to a quarter past midnight), the bureau of the CSC declared itself squarely opposed to the government's proposals relative to social security:

"The bureau notes that various proposals relative to social security are unacceptable to the CSC, because too many efforts are asked of those insured under it--notably, an increase in the health-care deductible and a decrease in the family allowances and unemployment benefits. Thus the CSC, in the course of the negotiations with the government, will uphold the safeguarding of social security on the basis of the program defined by the CSC committee meeting on 27 November 1981."

The CSC's position is certainly less rigid than that of the FGTB, and leaves the way open to negotiation. Nevertheless, if Martens V does not back off on certain specific points (500-franc levy for all beneficiaries of family allowances, decrease in unemployment benefit for cohabitants, increase in the health-care deductible, certain measures relating to young people's unemployment, etc), the government runs the risk of facing a united CSC and FGTB.

When it learned of the CSC's reaction, the government decided to move ahead the meeting it was to have had with the trade-union interlocutors this Thursday: it has called them to a meeting at 3 pm on Wednesday. It will see them again at 10 am on Thursday. Could decisions be taken at this time? Or will the government be content to listen to its interlocutors and then meet in cabinet council at 1 pm?

What will happen if the government does not manage to calm the CSC? Will a CSC-FGTB common front launch strikes and still more strikes? It does not look like it: the national CSC, and even the Walloon CSC, do not seem particularly favorable to that means of action. They would prefer, it seems, a great "march on Brussels" that would rally, in addition to the workers, the unemployed, housewives, young people--in short, all those who would be affected by the government measures.

Decisions will doubtlessly be taken during the meeting of the enlarged committee (some 600 persons) that will take place on Monday.

But Martens V still has the possibility of [word illegible] some "flowers" to the CSC--for example, by deciding on elimination of the social-contributions ceiling immediately rather than as of this coming 1 June, or by abandoning the 500-franc levy on family allowances, a lump-sum approach that the trade unions consider especially unjust: they are favorable to graduation of taxation in function of total income--in other words, to the principle of solidarity.

11267

CSO: 3100/441

## BRIEFS

ECONOMIST: AUSTERE POLICY NEEDED--"There continues to be a need to improve the international competitiveness of Danish businesses and initially it is up to us to bring about this improvement," said the chief economist of the Danish Bank, deputy director Ib Christensen. In the March issue of the bank's paper, ORIENTERING, he writes that of course one can hope that future declines in the dollar price of oil will reduce the need to improve Danish competitiveness. Cheaper energy imports would relieve the pressure on the balance of payments, of course--assuming that the Danish dollar exchange rate does not increase. At the same time, though, we must pursue an austere economic policy. [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 15 Mar 82 Sec III p 1] 6578

CSO: 3106/82



## NEW DEBATE ON VETTER SUCCESSION; PFEIFFER'S DGB CANDIDACY UNCERTAIN

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 15 Mar 82 p 27

[Article: "An Unholy Mess--Next Week the DGB Leadership Will Have To Discuss Anew the Question of Who Is To Succeed Heinz Oskar Vetter--Alois Pfeiffer's Candidacy No Longer Appears Secure"]

[Text] He did not think he had done anything wrong, Alois Pfeiffer said a few weeks ago, but if his colleagues did not want him to be the new chairman of the German Labor Union Federation (DGB), they should be sure to "indicate that" to him "in time."

They have now done so. His colleagues at the base having been grumbling increasingly about the events surrounding "Neue Heimat," the union leaders will meet in a special session a week from Wednesday [24 March] to consider anew whether Pfeiffer actually can succeed Heinz Oskar Vetter as chairman of the DGB.

Like Vetter or, for instance, Metal Workers Union chief Eugen Loderer, Pfeiffer had participated in the Neue Heimat residential development in Berlin. Critics in their own ranks are reproaching the union leaders for having behaved like capitalists in enriching themselves at the taxpayer's expense.

Particularly Heinz Kluncker, chairman of the Public Service, Transportation and Communications Union (OeTV), does not appear to be satisfied with the way the DGB leadership is handling private investments.

As early as Monday 2 weeks ago [1 March] Kluncker had urged the prospective successor of Vetter to withdraw his candidacy for ethical reasons. Pfeiffer, however, obtained support from Vetter and Construction Workers Union Chairman Rudolf Sperner and told the DGB National Executive the next day that after 30 years' work for the unions he would not submit to pressure. He would be a candidate.

For a start, his critics among the 26 members of the DGB leading body kept silent. Ernst Haar, head of the Railroad Workers Union, who only a short time before the session had been vociferous in his demand that the union movement be purged of any officials involved in the Neue Heimat scandal, no longer expressed any misgivings. And Adolf Schmidt of the Mining and Energy Union,

who had strongly insisted on discussing Pfeiffer's candidacy, like Kluncker appeared to be ready to give in.

Appearances were deceptive, though. On the following Wednesday the discussion on the national executive erupted anew. This time Kluncker sent his deputy, Siegfried Merten, into the breach.

Merten made it known that the way the DGB leadership was handling the Neue Heimat case was considered "an unholy mess" by the local union members. To the applause of his colleagues, the OeTV man called on the DGB leaders at long last to make a clean sweep and to stop issuing again and again clean bills of health.

Jochen Fuerbeth, Rhineland-Palatinate head of the Trade, Banks and Insurance Union (HBV), made things even clearer. He said he had jotted down concrete questions which had occurred to him "quite spontaneously" during Merten's speech and now wanted the DGB leadership's replies to them.

Fuerbeth wanted to know how things were going as far as the investments in the Berlin residential development were concerned. Above all, he said, he was interested to know whether union members had shared in construction "without immediate monetary investment." He had heard that the DGB officials had not had to come up with a single penny's worth of capital of their own.

Vetter could not come up with an immediate precise answer. He pointed out that the Berlin authorities of course had examined and approved all that went on. HBV Executive member Hanshorst Viehof found that statement "odd."

A few days later Vetter came up with supplementary written explanations. He wrote to the members of the national executive that actually the Berlin shares required investment of capital of one's own but that it was also possible to come up with it through "prefinancing by way of personal loans."

The HBV colleagues are still not satisfied. No later than at the special session of 24 March, Vetter is to come with yet more precise answers. What interests the unionists most is whether perhaps Neue Heimat itself helped out the investors with loans.

The stubbornness of the Pfeiffer critics might now induce the DGB leadership after all to look around for a new man to succeed Vetter, who is leaving his post for reasons of age. Anyway, the risk of the more than 500 delegates at the mid-May DGB national congress rejecting the candidate is growing steadily.

For Pfeiffer it would mean the end of his union career. If he is out as DGB chairman, he will not be in a position either to run for his present post of member of the DGB managing executive.

The DGB is finding it all the more difficult to decide against Pfeiffer because it is not easy to find another candidate. Now all those who have already been under discussion are again under consideration. Thus some union leaders would like to propose Adolf Schmidt of the Mining and Energy Union.

And there is also again talk about Guenter Doeding (Food and Restaurant Workers Union) or Ernst Breit of the Postal Union.

Whatever the decision of the DGB leadership in Frankfurt a week from Wednesday, it will by no means solve all the bothersome personnel questions.

One day after the session of the executive, with similar personnel, the supervisory board of the Gewerkschaftsholding Beteiligungsgesellschaft fuer Gemeinwirtschaft AG [Social Economy Trade Union Holding Company Inc] will hold its session, and there too the center of attention will be a meritorious personality of the German labor movement--holding company chief Walter Hesselbach.

8790

CSO: 3103/350

## IMPORTS FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA TO BE MORE RESTRICTED

Paris LE MONDE in French 6 Feb 82 p 31

[Text] The Brussels Commission has authorized France to exercise much stricter supervision over imports of a whole range of items coming from Southeast Asia, in order to protect its industries concerned.

Transistor radio sets (radio receivers, whether or not equipped for cassettes, coming from Hong Kong and Taiwan are aimed at primarily.

Quota measures applied to imports of these radios. But, in spite of these restrictions, and owing especially to the "tourist" circuit followed by these items within the EEC, these imports had been from 30 to 50 percent greater than the specified quotas. Therefore, the French Government is going to suspend import licenses until 31 August. This measure is applicable to import requests submitted after 11 January for transistor radio sets coming from Taiwan and after 13 January for radios coming from Hong Kong.

The Community authorities have also authorized France to regulate until 31 July imports of camping tents made in South Korea; until 30 September, imports of umbrellas and parasols coming from Taiwan and Hong Kong, and, finally, to supervise very closely, until 30 June, shipments of footwear (Taiwan), toys and small-scale models (Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, China)--the Eastern countries are also included on this last list--shirts and blouses (Indonesia), dresses and pajamas (China).

In Hong Kong, quartz watch makers, hit in October by French quota measures, (LE MONDE for 27 October 1981), decided to form an association, in order to take retaliatory measures. The Tele-Art Company, one of the largest in the sector, has already initiated a vast campaign in the press. It calls especially on the local authorities to increase customs duties applied to imports of French consumer goods and it even threatens to call for a boycott of all goods coming from France.

10,042  
CSO: 3100/362

## BRIEFS

AID TO NATIONALIZED GROUPS--The five industrial groups subject to nationalization, assigned by the public authorities the task of calculating the consequences of a "bold" 5-year development plan, are said, without acting in concert with each other, to have all reached the same conclusion: the need for assistance amounting to 5 billion francs for each one over a 5-year period.  
[Text] [Paris LE POINT in French 8-14 Feb 82 p 29] 10042

CSO: 3100/362

## BRIEFS

ICELANDAIR IMPROVING FINANCIAL SITUATION--The Icelandic Airlines Company, Icelandair, seems to have got over the big crisis to which the company was subject in 1979 and 1980, the management of the company states. The annual accounts of Icelandair for 1981 will not be made public until the company's general meeting in April, but the director of administration of the company, Sigurdur Helgason, says that 1981 will be a year in which the company will have yielded a profit. Drastic cuts in the operating costs, which, among other things, resulted in the dismissal of approximately 50 percent of the staff and reorganization of the entire company, have now had the desired effect, Sigurdur Helgason states. State subsidies from the Icelandic state in the form of repayments of landing fees for 1980 and 1981 as well as similar aid from Luxembourg also contributed to the improvement in the situation. The government of Luxembourg decided to support Icelandair during the temporary operational difficulties of the company, seeing that the company for about 30 years has accounted for the major part of the influx of tourists to the country. [Text] [Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 25 Feb 82 p 2] 7262

CSO: 3106/81

## FRANCOPHONE DEMOCRATIC FRONT HOLDS CONGRESS

Brussels LE SOIR in French 9 Mar 82 p 2

[Article by J. Cl.: "The FDF (Democratic Front of Brussels French Speakers) Wants to Be Prudent and Does Not Accept Any Regionalization"]

[Text] "As for the defeat of 8 November--every political party undergoes that trial sooner or later--we had to analyze its internal and external causes. But I state firmly: today's congress puts an end to that period. We are not going to continue to beat our breasts until it happens that we lose the communal elections."

And Mme Spaak, president of the FDF, added that the time had come to show that one is strong. Because the battle that the party has been waging for the last 18 years is entering a new phase: everything suggests that the national state is cracking and that the Flemish nation, convinced of its power, is going to want to put out to sea, after first attempting to lay siege to Brussels and make it tip over to Flanders' side. Thus the entire French community, and the FDF in particular, has to examine attentively the proposal by the CVP [Christian People's Party] to regionalize the five national sectors. It must not be forgotten, for example, to settle the accounts of the past, and the big infrastructure projects must not be omitted from these accounts.

At its congress on Saturday, the FDF wrote a text on the strategy to be followed in the coming months, a sort of party credo. The other political formations, it says, are today copying the FDF's watchwords; Brussels is injured and systematically impoverished ("the Bruxellois' resources are taken from them and only a third is given back to them"). The Brussels region, which has the financial and economic means to live on its own, must therefore be recognized as a full-fledged entity within the French community. The FDF rejects the Flemish state's imposing its regionalization, a new economic version of "Walen buiten."

And "untamed capitalism as well as bureaucratic socialism" is to be rejected.

## No Concession

The FDF, from this perspective, has decided that it will not participate in any government and will not support any so long as the political, cultural, social and economic rights of the Brussels region and its inhabitants are not restored



to them, and it swears that it will wage a battle without concession to that end.

This party, which had organized this congress primarily for talking about the communal elections, manifestly feels obliged by the recent evolution of political life to deepen its thinking. "The FDF must find another language," said Mme Spaak. While one reads in its resolutions that "the congress of the FDF charges the various units of the party to prepare in the shortest time possible a program of action preparing the way for the FDF's victory in the communal elections."

A general council meeting for the near future, perhaps even before Easter, has also been announced already, to perfect the future political strategy.

However, on Saturday the congress participants made certain choices in the matter of communal policy, community policy and economic policy.

#### Closer to the Citizens

With reference to communal matters, we note in particular the assertion of the importance of the quality of life, and the denial that the financial balance of the communes is the most important thing, the desire to see the international role of Brussels amplified, and the importance assigned to the inhabitants' participation in decision-making, especially in urban planning.

On the other hand, the FDF cites Brussels' place in the French community, and demands that 25 percent of the community credits be devoted to Brussels. It would like the competencies of the community to be broadened, says it is concerned about the fact that the Flemish live longer than the Francophones, and asks its deputies in Parliament to submit to the Community Council a proposal for a decree relative to family assistance in the areas of contraception, voluntary termination of pregnancy and responsible parenthood. It demands that the educational norms for the Francophone schools be modeled on the norms of the Flemish schools, it calls for the creation of cultural jobs (today there are only 1,500 unemployed persons put to work in the area of culture), it opposes the monopoly of the RTBF [Belgian Radio Broadcasting and Television System--French Section] and insists on preservation of the public service.

In economic matters, the FDF thinks that the essential thing is the mastery and rehabilitation of public finances, and considers that regionalization will constitute a beginning of rehabilitation. It faults the authorities for conceiving economic policy in function of Flemish objectives (thus, it considers, the devaluation was decided on in function of Flemish interests), declares in favor of keeping pay indexed, considers that savings should be properly remunerated and that company taxes should therefore decrease. It calls for regionalization of savings collection, and hopes that smaller units will replace the state authorities.

11267

CSO: 3100/442

## BULGARIAN YOUTH DAILY INTERVIEWS CYPRIOT YOUTH LEADER

AU241430 Sofia BTA in English 1350 GMT 24 Mar 82

["United in the Anti-Imperialist Struggle"--BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, 24 Mar (BTA)--Mr (Dimitris Hristophias), secretary general of the Central Council of the United Democratic Youth Organization in Cyprus in an interview before NARODNA MLADZHZH said that the organization is against the existence of the British military bases on the territory of Cyprus which are being ever more actively used by the U.S.A. for the aims of its aggressive policy.

He pointed out that the most topical political task facing the youth organization is the preparation of the forthcoming president's elections. "We can be sure that if the reactionary Democratic Rally Party of Mr Khliridhis wins the elections, the NATO presence in Cyprus will be further increased. This is why the most important task for our organization is to mobilize greater number of young people around AKEL--the party of the working class of Cyprus, to wage a struggle against the attempts of the reactionary forces to impose a president of their own, Mr (Hristophias) said.

He stressed that, loyal to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and the proletarian internationalism, the organization fights in defence of the young people in Cyprus, for their education in the spirit of internationalism and solidarity with the peoples fighting against the imperialist oppression.

"Along with this our organization stands for the Cyprus' preserving as an independent, sovereign state, for the preserving of its territorial integrity, against the NATO plans for converting the island in a "non-sinking aircraft-carrier," the leader of the United Democratic Youth Organization of Cyprus said.

CSO: 4600/356

## DEVALUATION SHOWS JØRGENSEN CANNOT DEPEND ON SF, RADICALS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 28 Feb 82 Sec II pp 1-2

[Article by Solveig Rødsgaard]

[Excerpts] The sequel to the devaluation events of the week has revealed that the government cannot base its existence on the Radical Liberal Party and the Socialist People's Party. This also appears from this talk between Niels Helveg Petersen and Gert Petersen.

Gert Petersen and Niels Helveg Petersen--who, at Christiansborg, do not reject the description "the Petersen and Petersen acrobats in a stationary circus"--are in agreement on the goal but in complete disagreement on the means to solve the problems together with the Jørgensen government. Niels Helveg Petersen of the Radical Liberal Party demands intervention to improve the competitive power carried through by 5 June to avoid an even higher unemployment rate. Gert Petersen of the Socialist People's Party is willing to do almost anything to ensure employment but cannot stand hearing the word incomes policy.

The differences clearly show that the government cannot base its existence on Petersen and Petersen. And the past week certainly also shows that it is not just a question of slight differences of opinion in the political views of Petersen and Petersen. It is true that both the Radical Liberal Party and the Socialist People's Party voted in favor of the budget, the Socialist People's Party for the first time in many years. But the events in connection with the devaluation revealed how far apart the two parties are in their relations with the government.

#### Incomes Policy

After the 3 percent devaluation, without any subsequent legislation, the government plans to pursue an incomes policy. Are we to experience that the government prepares an incomes policy together with the Radical Liberal Party and the parties to the right, while the Socialist People's Party does not at all want to participate?

Gert Petersen: We are somewhat bitter toward the government after the devaluation weekend. The government ought to have presented these problems at an

earlier point. To us, the government has stated that there was no immediate need to tighten the incomes policy. We got that impression both during the negotiations in December and later on. For that reason, it was somewhat surprising to us that they now attempted such a cavalry charge. The devaluation events show, at any rate, that the government intends to intervene. But, in my opinion, the government ought to sit down with the rest of us to find out if we can figure out other ways of maintaining our favorable trade situation. In the course of the last 2 years, we have improved our competitiveness by 18-20 percent. Forced intervention in respect of wages and salaries is far worse than what Niels Helveg Petersen has referred to as the forced placement of the money of those paying to pension funds. In intervening against the cost of living adjustments, they intervene against an agreement to safeguard the wage-earners against inflation which has been entered into by the wage-earners and which has been the basis for their acceptance of specific wage agreements. I do find that they have the same claims to consideration as those paying to pension funds, where not even we have demanded intervention against their safeguards against inflation. On the contrary. The point of departure has all the time been that one ought to respect the safeguards against inflation. So, if incomes policy is defined as intervention on the part of the Folketing against cost of living increments, we shall, under no circumstances, want to participate, regardless of how the other parties vote.

Niels Helveg Petersen: I am absolutely convinced that, in order to avoid a serious deterioration of the employment situation, we must also have a contribution from the wage and cost developments, and I shall certainly take a very somber view of our situation unless the government makes a move this spring. In my opinion, they ought, by Constitution Day [5 July], to have carried through measures to improve our competitiveness to prevent a rapid deterioration of the situation. This is not a view invented by us for the occasion. We have held that view all the time, also during the election campaign. But, with the devaluation, things have somehow become visible, and I am surprised at Gert's statement that it did not appear during the December negotiations, etc. Well, there were no concrete plans to intervene. But everybody clearly felt that they were on their way. It is true that we have been European champions during the last 2 years, as far as the improvement of our competitive power is concerned, but we started so far behind that we need an improvement for 3, 4 and 5 years before we shall actually feel an improvement in our employment situation. I do not understand how the Socialist People's Party, which has got green positions, wanting a low growth rate and not wanting to force through an increase in the real consumption, in practical politics, in that way, will allow the private consumption to be the Alpha and Omega.

#### Cooperation

Incidentally, both Gert Petersen and Niels Helveg Petersen feel that the cooperation in the Folketing during the last few weeks has shown a more flexible pattern than hitherto. As put by Niels Helveg Petersen:

"The bloc division into who can make things with whom is breaking down entirely. The Socialist People's Party is preparing a housing policy together with the Center Democrats, which party, as far as I understood, was the party which was farthest removed from the Socialist People's Party as far as the housing policy was concerned."

It is difficult to predict the lifetime of the government.

Niels Helveg Petersen: The more realistic the government is in its evaluation of the country's economic situation, i.e. the more somberly it views it, the longer it may survive.

Gert Petersen: The real brink is not the one on which certain members of the Council of Economic Advisers are concentrating. The real brink is if this country in the course of the next couple of years, will reach an unemployment rate of 500,000 unemployed. We shall then experience an incredible dissolution of our society, which may very well become a threat to the democratic system.

Buttered Bread

Niels Helveg Petersen: I agree with Gert Petersen on that. But we disagree on the means to prevent it from happening.

Question: The means? Minister of Finance Knud Heinesen has said that the Socialist People's Party wants its bread buttered on both sides?

Gert Petersen: That is nonsense. Heinesen ought instead to give the reasons for a policy where neither side of the bread need to be buttered. During the last 2-3 years, while experiencing a fine improvement of our competitiveness, we have had a decline in real wages of 10-12 percent and an increase in the unemployment rate from 170,000 to 300,000. When I protest against that, he says that it means that I want to have both sides of my bread buttered. My conclusion is that Heinesen simply wants to serve dry bread.

7262

CSO: 3106/81



## PAPER COMMENTS ON DENMARK'S JOINING IN EC POLISH SANCTIONS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 11 Mar 82 p 8

[Editorial: "Signal to Soviet Union"]

[Text] Sanctions are a big word to use in respect of the greatly limited economic measures taken by the EC countries toward the Soviet Union, and in which Denmark has now also joined. It would be more correct to talk about a declaration--a political signal to the Soviet Union. Economic sanctions are a trade policy weapon, which, if used as a massive coercive measure, may pressure, or force, an opponent to change, or to give up, a political line of action. The modest restrictions of the trade with the Soviet Union, which, in the case of Denmark, will affect 1 percent of the import this year, do not at all have such a magnitude, nor the intention. Nobody has any illusions of being able to force through a change of the policy pursued by the Soviet Union by such means. Their purpose is to show that the European countries find the Soviet Union's support and encouragement of General Jaruzelski's continued policy of oppression in Poland incompatible with the good neighborly relations in Europe. It is not a declaration of economic warfare to the Soviet Union but an expression of the view held by the countries in the West that, in encouraging a continued state of emergency in Poland, the Soviet Union, in a disturbing manner, is upsetting the basis for normal relations and cooperation in Europe.

It is a position announced by the European countries after mature consideration. The United States launched its symbolic restrictions of its relations with the Soviet Union and Poland already 2 weeks after the declaration of martial law. After the turn of the year, the Councils of Ministers of the EC and NATO joined in the demands for a termination of the state of emergency and the release of the prisoners, but they gave Poland a certain period of time to meet these demands. Jaruzelski himself set the time limit at the end of February but failed to observe it and, during the negotiations last week in Moscow, on the contrary, undertook to carry on the harsh policy. So the time must be said to have come for sending this more emphatic signal to the Soviet Union.

The state of emergency has now been going on for 3 months, and Denmark has got its share of the responsibility for the slow reaction of the West European



countries. Not because the Danish government disagreed on the opportuneness of sending this political signal to the Soviet Union, but because, with its dogmatic and stiff attitude to the European cooperation, it felt compelled to make a fuss about the articles of the Rome Treaty. The other EC countries wanted to use the article governing the trade policy which made it possible to carry through the restrictions administratively. In that way, it would still be possible, at this late point of time, to take fast action. It would be possible to avoid a time-consuming and perhaps politically difficult parliamentary discussion of the actual legislation governing sanctions, and it would be possible conveniently to take this mere first step before the U.S. government delegation comes to Europe next week to discuss the second step. But, as if by natural law, Denmark obstructed a decision in the Council of Ministers by way of a Danish reservation, for the object of the restrictions was political and not a matter of trade policy. This serious, fundamental objection was not too weighty, for, after 2 weeks of reflection and with the blessing of the Market Committee, it was abandoned. But, at any rate, they succeeded in keeping alive the impression of the Danes as the most inflexible guys in Europe.

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## CP CHAIRMAN JENSEN IN MOSCOW, PLEDGES TRY TO GET SHIP ORDER

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 15 Mar 82 Sec III p 1

[Text] The chairman of the Danish CP, Jorgen Jensen, has extended his stay in the Soviet Union to try and influence the Russians to sign an order for eight ferryboats, he announced yesterday in Moscow.

Jorgen Jensen would not call the Soviet Union's cancellation of a meeting with Danish shipyard people this week a retaliation for Denmark's support of the EC sanctions against Moscow in connection with Poland.

The shipyard people will be coming here in 9 days, instead, according to Jensen.

But he said that Denmark's decision to cut Soviet imports by 1 percent could act as an argument for the groups in the Soviet Union which oppose the purchase of the Danish ferries.

It is no secret that there has been a discussion between the companies that will use the ferries and the Soviet Ministry of Trade.

The former would prefer to have the Danish ferries because of their quality. But the Trade Ministry, with an eye to the exchange balance, would rather buy Yugoslav ships, said Jorgen Jensen.

In this situation it is clear that Denmark's sanctions benefit the side that wants to save hard currency and buy from Yugoslavia instead of Denmark, the CP chairman continued.

In addition, part of the problem is that the Russians are concerned about what the next step by the West might be. If they sign an order with Danish shipyards, will they run the risk later of being unable to get the Danish ferries due to an embargo? asked Jorgen Jensen.

He has been in Moscow for party consultations for a week and should have returned home on Tuesday.

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## CONSERVATIVE NAMED CHAIRMAN OF NEW NONSOCIALIST PEACE GROUP

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 15 Mar 82 p 1

[Article by Jorn Mikkelsen]

[Text] The national chairman of Conservative Youth, Lars Poulsen, was elected yesterday as the first chairman of a new, nonsocialist peace movement, named Democratic Peace Action. This happened at a meeting in Vejen where 100 KU [Conservative Youth] advisers from the entire country had gathered.

A few hours later the new peace movement received the first overtures from various political organizations. Among others the Center Democrats showed interest. At the same time a private individual provided a telephone and office space. The new chairman, Lars Poulsen, said of the background for setting up the Democratic Peace Action:

"We feel that the existing peace movement directly increases the threat of war with their onesided demands for western arms reduction. It is shocking how many Danes have been enticed into this KGB cover organization. We will now attend all peace demonstrations to make sure that a balanced view of the issues is given. It is a lie when the existing peace movement claims that it goes across political lines. There will probably be some hard confrontations, but we are ready."

Democratic Peace Action will join the peace march through East Europe which the existing peace movement has planned to hold this summer along the lines of last year's march to Paris. Lars Poulsen does not expect that Democratic Peace Action will be allowed to slip through the Iron Curtain, "but that would almost be the best proof of the way in which the East bloc regards the existing peace movement," Lars Poulsen concluded.

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## BRIEFS

CENTER-DEMOCRATS' YOUTH ORGANIZATION--Now CD [Center-Democratic Party] has its own youth organization. A group of young CD members founded Center-Democratic Youth with political science student Stig Nielsen as chairman. He says the purpose of the youth organization is to rally young people around CD policies and to profile CD externally both on the national and the international level. [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 15 Mar 82 p 7] 6578

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## DANISH OFFICIALS: GREENLAND CAN STILL PARTICIPATE IN EC

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 26 Feb 82 p 12

[Text] The fact that Greenland will still be subject to political cooperation in the EC will give rise to "grotesque situations," an EC expert states, whereas the Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that it is a question of "hair-splitting" to believe that the situation will give rise to problems.

Even if the Greenlanders, last Tuesday, decided to withdraw from the EC, they will still remain subject to the political cooperation among the EC countries--a cooperation which will have ever increasing significance.

Within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is not believed that an expanded political cooperation will have any economic consequences, and they, therefore, see no reason for taking up the problem for consideration.

A Danish expert on market law says, on the other hand, that the situation will give rise to "grotesque situations" in the future, and EC opponents state that the political cooperation already at this stage is so integrated that it will be impossible to separate the economic cooperation.

The paradox is due to the fact that the political cooperation is formally an independent part of the Danish foreign policy and not included in the Rome Treaty. And the Greenland home rule arrangement does not comprise foreign policy matters, which, due to the fact that Denmark and Greenland have the same national government, are taken care of sovereignly by the Danish government.

The problem will rapidly become a comprehensive one, says former secretary of the EC Parliament, Holger K. Nielsen, who tells INFORMATION that the entire matter should be taken up for independent negotiations between the Greenland home rule government and the Danish government.

## Grotesque Situations

Lecturer on European market law Hjalte Rasmussen, the Copenhagen School of Economics and Business Administration, tells INFORMATION:

"The problem is a logical consequence of the fact that Denmark and Greenland have the same national government, which means that the foreign policy is worked out sovereignly by the Danish government."

"It is, of course, possible that Greenland, to a larger extent, will be consulted in the future, but, formally, there will be no change in the relationship after the Greenland referendum."

"The Greenland referendum concerned exclusively the Rome Treaty itself, and most people forgot the many things which are not included in the treaty."

Question: Will this state of affairs not lead to a number of grotesque situations where Greenland will be subject to a political decision but will have no influence on the economic consequences?

Answer: Indeed, I would safely endorse that. But, formally, this is the same situation as in West Germany where the federal government pursues the foreign policy which the individual member states are then bound by," Hjalte Rasmussen says.

#### Bordering on Hair-Splitting

In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Henrik Poulsen, chief of section of the political department, confirms that Greenland will still be subject to the political cooperation, but he finds that it is bordering on hair-splitting to find a problem in that. He tells INFORMATION:

"I fail to see any real connection between these things. Of course, it is true that the political cooperation is being expanded at the moment, but that need not have any economic consequences. Of course, situations may arise in which doubts arise whether a matter belongs under the political or the economic cooperation, but it is bordering on hair-splitting to make this a problem."

#### Integrated in the EC

Holger K. Nielsen, M.P. for the Socialist People's Party and former secretary of the EC Parliament, says that it is unreasonable to consider the political cooperation an independent part of the Danish foreign policy. He tells INFORMATION:

"The political cooperation becomes increasingly integrated in the entire EC structure. At present, they are in Brussels in the process of establishing an independent bureaucracy which will safeguard the political cooperation, and the EC Commission participates directly in the cooperation."

"It simply is not possible to separate the economic cooperation from the political cooperation."

"The consequence must be that negotiations are carried on in respect of the entire problem directly between the Greenland home rule government and the Danish government."



Also Else Hammerich, who is a member of the EC Parliament for the Anti-EC Group, says that it would be illusory to distinguish between the political and the economic cooperation. She tells INFORMATION:

"After the London Declaration of last October, where the very EC Commission became involved directly in the political cooperation, it can, no longer, be said that it is a question of an independent cooperation among the Ten Countries. It is becoming increasingly integrated in the entire EC."

#### Independent Secretariat

The political cooperation among the EC countries (known in common usage as EPS) is not incorporated in the Rome Treaty, which exclusively concerns the economic cooperation. The political cooperation is based on the Davignon Report of 1970 and the Copenhagen Report of 1973 which concern the common political interests of the EC countries.

So far, the political cooperation has been administered by the country safeguarding the chairmanship of the EC, and, on a daily basis, the cooperation has been coordinated through a multitude of telex messages among the individual EC countries' foreign ministries.

Lately, the cooperation has become increasingly integrated. In the so-called London Declaration of last October, the EC countries thus established that the EC Commission was to participate, with independent status, in the political cooperation. According to Holger K. Nielsen, the EC Commission is, at the moment, establishing an independent secretariat in Brussels to safeguard the daily coordination of the political cooperation.

#### High Level of Ambitions

"As late as last week, the chairman of the EC Commission, Leo Tindemanns, was in the United States to explain the foreign policy positions of the EC," Holger K. Nielsen states, and he goes on to say:

"The EC countries have gradually coordinated their positions in nearly all international organizations, the most important examples of which, at the moment, probably are the UN and the Security Conference in Madrid."

It is no secret either that, in most places within the EC countries, there is a very high level of ambitions with regard to creating a joint, independent foreign policy for all of the EC countries and in all areas."

The London report on the political cooperation says, among other things:

"It is the conviction of the foreign ministers that the Ten, to an increasing degree, ought to seek to shape events and not just react to them."

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## COPPIK, SCHUBART AIM TO UNITE HESSE GREENS, ALTERNATIVES

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 15 Mar 82 pp 45, 47

[Article: "Homeric Laughter"]

[Text] At the start of the Landtag election campaign in Hesse, the Alternatives are in disagreement. Part of them want a unicolor Green slate, part of them a Checkered-Red one.

For a change, the contentious Greens of Frankfurt were in agreement. In early February they nominated "our friend" Alexander Schubart, 50, to be their direct-election candidate in the fall Landtag election, assuring him a prominent spot on the Land slate. "'Aschu' is the best alternative to Boerner and Dregger," applauded one delegate.

Only a couple of weeks later, Schubart, the symbolic figure on the opposition to the airport expansion, was kicked out again. Because the runway opponent had wondered out loud whether a Checkered-Red "electoral alliance of Alternative forces" might not, after all be better than a unicolor Green slate, his comrades-in-arms accused him of having "broken his word" and engaging in an "insidious splitting game."

Schubart, they now mocked, was but an "image-greedy crisscross thinker" engaging in "leading-candidate antics" and therefore "not acceptable." "The Greens," federal executive member Uli Tost shouted after the fired candidate, "are no self-service store or milch cow."

Late in February, however, Hesse's Greens suddenly increased their support of "Aschu" again when it became known that Chief Federal Prosecutor Kurt Rebmann had indicted Schubart, charging him with "attempted coercion" of the Hesse Government, "resisting officers implementing the law" and "breach of the peace." Rebmann thinks there is "sufficient evidence" of the initiator of the "Referendum/No-Runway-West Working Group" having committed a "criminal offense" with his appeal on 14 November for a blockade of the Frankfurt airport.

No sooner had the news of the indictment become known than the Greens reclaimed the man who had just been fired as their own. The "solidarity with Schubart"

was "unbroken," declared Manfred Zieran, Frankfurt municipal deputy and one of the leading proponents of Schubart's dismissal as a candidate. It could not be tolerated for "one of us, and thus ourselves, to be treated as a criminal."

Half a year before the Hesse Landtag election, which for the first time is to give the Alternatives some seats in the parliament in Wiesbaden, there is hopeless disarray among the Green movement, as evidenced by the to-and-fro about popular runaway fighter Schubart. "We are not exactly presenting an edifying picture," concedes Land executive member Frank Schwalba-Hoth.

The matter in dispute among Green party followers is how to break the "ruling bloc" (Schubart) of the three established parties in order, if possible, to prevent the major projects in Hesse--construction of a reprocessing installation, the third reactor at the Biblis nuclear power plant and the West runway.

Those in power in Hesse welcome the dispute, which is threatening to split the Alternative movement. The SPD-FDP coalition--far removed from a working majority, according to the latest polls--is entertaining new hopes for the fall election, the most important of the four Land elections this year. SPD Minister-President Holger Boerner, who has insured support for the Greens with his nuclear and concrete course, is already predicting a split of the Alternatives, saying that "they are tearing each other to pieces."

Alfred Dregger has even more to hope for than the Boerner government. Two competing Alternative slates, the thinking goes, are bound to fail each to overcome the 5-percent hurdle--and, in the bargain probably will give the rightwing Christian Democrats an absolute majority.

Whereas elsewhere--in Hamburg, for instance--Greens and Alternatives have begun to agree on joint slates, it remains to be seen whether the split Alternatives in Hesse will be green again in time before the election takes place.

Part of them, such as Schubart, envisage a broad alliance which is to include members of the peace and women's movement, Spontis, autonomous groups and defecting Social Democrats--in sum, the entire protest potential.

This, Wiesbaden Green Wolfgang Herbert argues, would even entail a "two-digit election result." If, on the other hand, the desired alliance should founder on the Greens' resistance, "there will be Homeric laughter on the part of the ruling bloc," Schubart predicts.

The others meanwhile, particularly fairly veteran officials and municipal parliamentarians among the Greens such as Frankfurt Municipal Deputy Milan Horacek, consider a Checkered alliance "superfluous." He says the Greens have long since attained their "own programmatic identity," which they should not make subject to negotiation in talks about cooperation. "We are the launched opposition and will not allow any alliance to be imposed on us," says Manfred Zieran.

If the opponents of a pact should prevail among the Greens, this would ruin above all the strategy of former Social Democratic Bundestag Deputy Manfred Coppel, 38. On 20 March Coppel intends to launch in Recklinghausen a new leftwing party called "Democratic Socialists," using the infrastructure of the Greens in municipalities and groups for building it up.

Among the Greens, the man from Offenbach has predominantly received refusals. According to the official version spread by the national executive of the Greens, "there is no room anymore between the Greens and the SPD." Says Coppel, embittered: "Surely the Greens have not taken out a patent for Alternatives."

Most Greens do not seem to be impressed by Coppel's threat that if the talks about an electoral alliance fail he will found a "Democratic Socialist Party" throughout Hesse. If the "prominent Bundestag deputy expects any bended knees, he has taken the wrong boat," mocks the Green Uli Tost. And Horacek reduces his opinion of a party in line with Coppel's idea to the formula "vegetable casserole."

As yet alliance strategists Coppel and Schubart have not quite abandoned hope that an electoral pact between Greens, Reds and Checkered will materialize. Since early May, Coppel has been preaching "cooperation" day in and day out in discussion meetings throughout Hesse.

Recently it already looked as if Coppel would fail miserably to unite the antiauthoritarian Alternatives (Horacek: "we excel in sawing off gurus"), but then the indictment by the Office of the Chief Federal Prosecutor against Coppel's comrade-in-arms Schubart caused a change in the trend. Ever since Rebmann has been pursuing Schubart, the runaway opponent has encountered a wave of support.

Greens from the Land District of Greater Gerau affected by the airport expansion are pleading with the Frankfurt District Executive to nominate Schubart as a candidate again. The Alternatives consider the charges against Schubart by the Office of the Chief Federal Prosecutor as greatly exaggerated.

According to the indictment, Schubart with his appeal for a blockade of Frankfurt airport at a big demonstration in Wiesbaden on 14 November 1981, in which more than 100,000 peacefully demonstrated against the runway, "attempted to coerce the government illegally." And one day thereafter, Schubart allegedly "physically attacked" a policeman at the airport and "incited" a "crowd of people" to "violence."

The Karlsruhe investigators have not cited any evidence for the two charges. Schubart swears that he was "at home" that day, going out "only to walk the dog."

And so Schubart's lawyers last week petitioned for the trial before the Frankfurt Superior Court not to take place. If it should come to a trial nevertheless, the Alternatives plan "the biggest demonstration this country has ever seen."

## PAPER COMMENTS ON KOIVISTO'S TRIP TO SOVIET UNION

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 12 Mar 82 p 2

[Editorial: "Relations with the East Firmly Unchanged"]

[Text] President Mauno Koivisto's Moscow visit has assumed a noticeably more visible foreign cast than the description of the trip — a working visit — would of necessity have led us to suppose. Top Soviet leaders generously devoted their time to the event. The people of the Soviet Union were also to a great extent familiarized with Koivisto through the country's official news media.

The working visit included work. The communique issued at the end of his visit indicates that they managed to go over all of the uppermost issues concerning international affairs and affairs between the two countries in the discussions. The communique itself was as long as a final press release for an official state visit.

The essential outcome of the visit was that it was confirmed that Finnish-Soviet relations are on a sound basis and absolutely unchanged. Dozens of different matters were reviewed during the talks and after a fashion apparently recorded so that the partners' views in no way differ from what was known and announced earlier. Since a quick preliminary meeting was involved, the catalogue-like nature of the communique is quite understandable.

As regards practical cooperation, the only problem of current interest has for some time now been the trade imbalance between the two countries, Finland's lead in exports. The communique indicates that the goal is still to keep trade within the framework of both long-term and annual trade agreements. Both partners place particular importance on the Economic Cooperation Commission's important work. The significance for Finland of the visit that has taken place cannot be overestimated. A summit meeting very nearly always carries great weight in the handling of Finnish-Soviet relations. Regarded from this point of view, Finland's switch to a new presidential era has taken place naturally and without complications. Of course, Urho Kekkonen had already created the preconditions for credibility in Finland's firm policy. His own role was rightly acknowledged in the press release at the end of the visit.

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## DANKERT ON GOALS FOR EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Paris LE MATIN MAGAZINE in French 13 Feb 82 pp 35-37

/Interview with Piet Dankert, newly elected president of the European parliament, by Jcelle Kuntz and Jose-Alain Fralon; date and place not specified/

/Text/ Simone Veil, the "grande dame," has left the European parliament in the hands of the "Young Turk" Piet Dankert. For that difficult succession the need was indeed for a man of the quality of this Dutchman, as likeable as he is ambitious, who has chosen to shine by the praise of the plain citizen. Gone is the "too French" hierarchy; gone are "unjustified" honors; gone is the title "Excellency". Protocol will be simplified; absenteeism will be combated; and the double mandates of those worthies the deputies, who are too forgetful of their European duties, will be definitively condemned.

At 48, Piet Dankert wishes to reign "simply" over a parliament which he means to engage valiantly in all the great battles of Europe. A political wavering among the conservative groups is said to have brought about the election of this social democrat. But there is perhaps more to it: in Piet Dankert the European deputies have chosen the general in the best position to win their right to exist.

/Question/ As a Dutchman, you are taking over the presidency of a parliament led up to now by a Frenchwoman. A priori, what will that change?

/Answer/ Well, first of all, look at this building here, where we have our offices. The eighth floor, for example. The usher has seen everything change, from one day to the next. He's French, and an excellent usher. I'm going to keep him. But he can't get over it: he was used to a strict hierarchy, quite in keeping with French discipline, and so always on edge, because of course some things were not going right, and he worried. Now he is calm and relaxed, relationships are human, everything is open. Simone never left her office to go and see a secretary or a colleague. As for me, I come and go without protocol, and that puts everyone at ease. I think this sort of conduct, being simpler, will have deep repercussions on the whole administration. It will be possible to move freely everywhere, without having to announce oneself in wri-



ting or waste time in requesting audiences. A parliament is nothing more than the assembled representatives of the people, so we have no reason to think we are greater than we are.

Question You married a Frenchwoman, and what's more, one from the south. Does that give you the feeling of understanding Europe better, in its cultural complexity?

Answer My marriage to a Latin has played a very large role for me. I no longer react quite like a Dutchman, and not quite like a Frenchman either. I'm almost stateless, as de Gaulle would have said, but I feel quite at ease in France, as I do in the Netherlands. On Dutch television I was recently asked about my attitude on the question of embracing. In the Netherlands it is very unusual to embrace a man. It is avoided from prudery. Now, when I won the election, I was rushed by Italians, Greeks, Frenchmen from the south, and we hugged as if we had always done it. That did not cause the slightest difficulty for me, since my wife's French origins had accustomed me to it. But you see, in the Netherlands I had to explain myself.

Question You allow yourself to be hugged by men, and that astonishes Netherlanders, but when you admit having smoked joints, then the French are surprised.

Answer Yes, the bourgeois circles of Strasbourg acted shocked. But just after having admitted smoking a joint from time to time, I heard them say they were sure all their children did it too. Before, they knew but kept the secret. In any case, I don't think it important. Politicians are quite normal people. They need have no privileged position. I'm reading Zinoviev's "The Yawning Heights," and I think there are many parallels between the Western and Russian societies. Not in the absurdities of bureaucracy, but in the notion of our elected members that theirs is a special position. Now, those elected are but representatives of the people. They have a job to do; if they don't do it, they should be dismissed.

Question Is it your impression that the European parliamentarians have done that job well for the past two and a half years? You are often pointed out as the only personality this parliament has really brought forth. Does not that mean the other deputies have fallen short of their potential?

Answer The European parliament is slowly beginning to transform itself. Let's say it has taken two and a half years for it to understand that it is elected by universal suffrage, that consequently it is no longer the same as the former one, and that this brings different responsibilities. Everywhere, I see signs of this change. My election is one, which has brought about others. For example, Egon Kleptsch, my opponent in the presidential election, is no longer president of the Christian Democratic group, and so much the better. Another sign: in December the chairmen of the political groups proposed the creation of additional committees. Not that there was any need for new committees. The real need was for more committee chairmen. That sort of thing was typical of the old parliament. Well, the majority of groups and deputies rejected the project. Does not that indicate a new ambience. Everyone is beginning to be convinced that the parliament's performance must now be improved. It must al-

so he said that some people are worried about the 1984 elections. Democratic legitimacy is at stake.

[Question] What can you do yourself to increase the authority of the parliament?

[Answer] First, there is the problem of administration. In two years this parliament has had a tremendous increase in personnel, which it has not properly assimilated, and this means that the infrastructure is not functioning at its best. Procedures are long. I had to spend the whole day, yesterday, looking for the amendments on Turkey. They were impossible to find. The machine is lacking in effectiveness. So it must be made to perform better.

Next, the parliament's debates, as such, are not sufficiently structured. There have been too many double mandates, too many people who never came. Many deputies had no parliamentary experience, and they had to serve an apprenticeship. They started out by wanting to change everything in two months, and now realize it can't be done in a century. They are becoming wiser. Good. From that point on, we must organize. Since we don't have very precise powers, unlike national parliaments where when a bill is voted it becomes law the next day, we must improve our contacts with the press, for that is practically our only means of communicating with our electorate. At the moment the European parliament is still widely misunderstood. Most of our constituents confuse the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, and the Council of Europe.

Farmers, for example, are very much aware of the European parliament, as they are of Europe in general, for it has direct implications for their work, income, and conditions of production. On the other hand, for most other sectors of society the role of the Community is more blurred, and the electorate does not see clearly the advantages it can expect from it. Let's take the example of steelmaking: what the parliament is doing in close collaboration with the Commission has succeeded. We have obtained an allocation from the Social Fund for restructuring of the steel industry. That is a good indication of the path ahead of us for the next two years. We must be aware of the fact that most of today's economic and social problems can no longer be solved at the national level. The European dimension is indispensable, as much for work scheduling as for restructuring of industry. Imagine what competition would be like if in one country the legal work week were 44 hours, and 35 in another. One does not have the impression that on such problems the parliament has really asserted itself.

Solely by its own strength, within a period of 5 years, and with its limited powers, the parliament cannot succeed in winning the electorate. Practically speaking, the stakes seem too small. So it needs the support of the entire Community. In my opinion, despite a few disappointments, Europe is healthier. And if Europe is healthier, the parliament has every chance of surviving, for it will be impelled by a current of optimism and creativity, which will allow it to have its own mind and its own vision. That is what we must attempt.

The parliament can have an exceptional stimulating role. Remember all our discussions on the Community budget. The deputies voted a famous amendment, which bears my name and which caused a scandal. The Commission and Council of Min-

isters cried that it was unacceptable, exaggerated, and the like. Well, last week the Council of Ministers adopted exactly my proposal of two years ago. What does that mean? That because of the particularities of this parliament there is a time lag between what it wants, what it votes for--all the motions that governments would gladly throw in the garbage can--and what is finally achieved.

Thus the president's mission is to assure that parliamentary decisions are followed through. So he must become something of a foreign minister, and go and ring the doorbells of the commissioners and ministers to convince them that the parliament's positions are well founded. One of our major errors, up till now, has been to think that with the vote on a resolution all was said and done, and everyone could go home relaxed. Was there a lack of follow-through on resolutions voted? Never mind, no one worried! But it's only when the process continues and consultation procedures operate that resolutions have their full effect.

Question Simone Veil, in your view, was not able to provide follow-through from the parliament to the other Community authorities?

Answer That's difficult to say. She tried, yes, but she was only partially successful. She was no doubt handicapped by a very French view of authority which led her to devote her influence to a function of formal representation. Her personal aura did indeed help her to establish the prestige of the parliament, but a more specifically political contribution can now be hoped for from the spokesman of the European deputies, so as to make as concrete as possible the formal powers conferred on us by universal suffrage.

Question You will travel less than she did?

Answer Yes, no doubt, outside Europe. I have but few remaining obligations in that quarter. She has made all the essential return visits, and I'm glad that for the first few months at least, I'll be able quietly to attend to urgent matters in Brussels.

Question Your family has joined you in Brussels?

Answer No, by no means. Nothing would induce my wife and children to leave Edam, the small Dutch town where we live. They prefer to remain outside the circles of the European parliament, in the quiet of a provincial town.

Question When you were a deputy, you took your stand for Brussels as the sole seat of the parliament. Since becoming president, you still favor a single seat, but you no longer cite Brussels.

Answer That's true.

Question And why?

Answer I don't think that problem can be settled before 1984. It's a priority, but considered one which will play no role in the 1984 elections. Then. . .

Question/ And yet those everlasting moves create a bad image of Europe. . . .

Answer/ The question is biased. The problem of the seat is not the voter's problem. For him, the problem is waste of time and money. So what does he do? He blames the parliament because he doesn't see that it's the governments which are responsible. It's perhaps for that reason, moreover, that governments let things slide and expenses cumulate. So the voter discredits the parliament. Certain people exult. . .

Question/ Before your election, some deputies were heard to say that the best way to get rid of the turbulent Dankert would be to put him in the presidency. But you don't seem to have settled down. You still have some sharp things to say about governments. You are hard on the Commission.

Answer/ The Commission? What is it doing? Every time he appears in Strasbourg, M Gaston Thorn, the great European, declares that he is the friend of the parliament, that we are natural allies, and the like. But the truth is that in order to survive politically the Commission works in close collaboration with the Council of Ministers in preparing resolutions. The result is that when it appears before the parliament it is already so compromised with the Council of Ministers that we are in fact faced by one of the institutional organs of the Community, but with two of them at once. That considerably weakens the parliament's position. I know it's difficult to do otherwise. The solution, no doubt, would be to return to majority rule, rather than unanimity, within the Council of Ministers. That way, the Commission could from time to time really place itself between the Council and the parliament. But for the moment the Commission is simply under the heel of the Council of Ministers. The result is that it sows confusion over the whole question of restructuring the budget, without having the political courage to present a comprehensive reform package which could bring about a solution. The commissioners are content to put very vague notes on paper, and to imagine tricks of detail, thus leaving it up to the Council to take the initiative of seeking comprehensive solutions. That's why I resent them.

Question/ Aren't you afraid of triggering a new conflict with the French over supranationality with such a speech?

Answer/ The battle against supranationality is a bit dated. I don't think we can yet either hope for or fear a supranational, or confederated, or federal Europe. In any event, those processes are not moving. As for me, I'm very pragmatic on that subject. The essential, for me, is to keep the countries of Europe together. And for that, the need is for such a degree of integration that everything won't explode at the first occasion. If there is no more common agricultural policy, no more common customs border, then yes, the risk is great that there won't be any more Europe. In this time of economic crisis, if there were no intergovernmental cooperation, each country would protect itself from its neighbors by protectionist measures, and that would be disastrous. Whereas the Community guarantees cohesion, despite technical difficulties. The rest--federalism, supranationalism--hardly interests me. We'll see.

Question You were saying just now that the parliament should find its own identity within the ensemble of European institutions. But with regard to Poland, for example, there was the impression that among the multiple national sensitivities it found only a very timid common denominator.

Answer The parliament took a position a few days after the events: a very prudent position. At that time, it was justified. But that does not exclude the possibility that things may change. A position is not necessarily permanent, but is adjusted and modified. Politics is a day by day affair, and a text is never valid forever. It is in France that they tend to be given eternal value. That being said, we must be careful. There is no sense in adopting a motion in foreign policy unless there is a link with what the Community can do. El Salvador? very well, provided we have an economic aid policy corresponding to what we want. Poland? Excellent, provided we can also talk of sanctions or other means of pressure. There is the case of Turkey. A resolution authorizes the parliament to intervene with the Turkish authorities to ask for the freedom of 52 members of DISK [expansion unknown] who are facing judgment. Good. If I take things according to the letter--and that's what I'll do--I could take the plane to Ankara and explain to the Turks that to obtain unblocking of Community financial aid they must take account of what people think here. After all, why couldn't the president of European parliamentarians do what Gaston Thorn does?

Question Is it not time for Europe to talk of defense?

Answer That subject is a bit taboo. But I've long been of the opinion that if we want to stimulate industrial production at the European Community level we are practically obliged to attend to defense, because the essentials of technological innovation go through military or related sectors.

Question You conceive a Europe autonomous from the two superpowers?

Answer With this exception: that from the nuclear standpoint Europe will never be autonomous. Our power, compared to that of the two others, is such that autonomy remains a dream.

Question You were once a convinced Atlanticist, now you are less so. How do you view the United States in relation to Europe? As benevolent? Imperialistic? Unfriendly?

Answer I don't know. Certain developments alarm me. For example, in cultural relations, the profound knowledge of Europe which marked the former leaders of America has disappeared. The whole intellectual east coast which managed relations with us has now left things in the hands of Californians, who are closer to China than to us. Then the superpowers, Russian and American, tend to accord privileged status to relations between themselves. That is a datum which can't be changed, but which is rather inconvenient for Europe.

Question Piet Dankert, in two years European deputies will once more go before their electorate. As president, on what success do you think this parliament will be able to campaign?



[Answer] This parliament must attain a real influence on the Commission in order to contribute to the reform of the Community. Europe still functions as if it consisted of six countries. But it is indispensable to redistribute wealth differently. It is senseless, for example, that the Netherlands should draw so much from the common treasury while the British record a net deficit. I understand the British complaints, even though I disagree with the solutions proposed by London. If restructuring is not accomplished, I express serious doubts about voter participation in 1984. That's the trick!

6145

CSO: 3100/389



## CONSERVATIVE LEADERSHIP IN TROMS FAVORS NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 3 Mar 82 p 2

[Article: "Conservative Party Committee For Nuclear-Free Zone"]

[Text] The Conservative Party leadership in Troms has shocked the national party leadership by supporting a provincial committee statement on nuclear-free zones.

The Troms provincial committee unanimously called on the government to work actively to establish a Nordic nuclear-free zone as a first step toward a broader European agreement.

"It is totally meaningless for a provincial committee to deal with such matters," Foreign Minister Sverre Strøm said. His fellow party member, member of parliament Margit Hansen Krone from Troms, stated that the provincial committee had acted irresponsibly.

It was reported from the Nordic Council meeting in Helsinki that the news from Troms had been the subject of much discussion among top Nordic politicians.

9336

CSO: 3108/73

## MILITARY RECRUITS' HIGHER INTELLIGENCE SCORES DISCUSSED

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 11 Feb 82 p 10

[Article by Harald Stanghelle]

[Text] "Norwegian recruits are getting smarter. Because of the high level of education, defense tests must be made more difficult and more complicated. The test we now are using was revised in 1980."

Division psychologist Solve Bjartmann of the Defense Psychology Service told this to ARBEIDERBLADET.

The Swedish newspaper EXPRESSEN came to the opposite conclusion concerning Swedish recruits. The newspaper used military enlistment statistics which show that the overall level of knowledge among Swedes is becoming lower and lower. The same test has been given to recruits for 7 years and the results have been worse and worse each year.

"While society constantly is becoming more complicated and incomprehensible, the people are becoming dumber and dumber," the newspaper wrote.

Psychologist Bjartmann was asked how he interpreted the results in Norway.

"We find that more and more recruits are receiving top grades, while fewer and fewer are ending up at the bottom of the grade scale. This means we must make the tests more difficult to obtain a normal distribution."

Bjartmann was then asked how the tests were utilized.

"The tests are given each session and they are used to distribute the recruits to the various services during their initial period of enlistment. Let me also add that in Norway our tests measure different abilities than the Swedish test," Bjartmann said.

Testing of recruits for initial military service began just after the war and the first tests were conducted in 1952. The purpose is to obtain a picture of the recruit's overall level of ability and the tests include vocabulary, arithmetic, and reaction patterns.

Bjartmann was asked if this did not favor young people with higher levels of education.

"Our experience is that the results are the same for groups with various levels of education. We find many examples of top scorers who do not have the corresponding formal education."

The psychologist was also asked when the next revision would be necessary.

"It is impossible to answer that question, but the test and the results are monitored continually and we can always make adjustments," psychologist Solve Bjartmann said. He also pointed out that all Norwegian recruits have the right to see their own test and results.

9336

CSO: 3108/73

## STRAY SEEN MAKING EFFORT TO ESTABLISH CLOSER EC TIES

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 2 Mar 82 p 9

[Article by Ulf Andenaes]

[Text] It is a sign of the times that, after Foreign Minister Sverre Stray's latest visit to Brussels, Norway has initiated closer ties with the EC in the realm of foreign policy with no debate or opposition here at home. The new ties were strengthened by the prime minister's trip to Bonn. There seems to be general agreement that we should cooperate more closely with the EC in this important area.

Foreign policy cooperation among EC countries (usually abbreviated EPS) has been the area in which the EC has enjoyed the greatest success in recent years, while economic cooperation has tended to stagnate. Outwardly, Western Europe is speaking more and more in unison as EPS has attained a rapidly increasing role in international politics.

Norway has moved closer to the EC in this connection because the EPS is about to put our country in a difficult situation. In actuality, most Norwegian industry, apart from agriculture and fishing, is coordinated within the EC system today. While the most important segments of our economy are included, we have remained on the outside in the political arena where the greatest progress has been made. As Western global politics appear more and more in the form of a dialog between the EC and the United States, Norway is in jeopardy of being caught in the middle. For regardless of whether Norway has improved its contact with the EC recently, we still remain outside an increasingly important part of the foreign policy decision-making process in Western Europe.

EPS cooperation is free of the massive bureaucracy for which the EC otherwise is reproached. EPS includes the following:

The foreign ministry of each individual EC country has a "European correspondent" who is responsible especially for the purely practical aspects of the cooperation.

These correspondents are subordinate to a political committee consisting of the heads of the political sections in the foreign ministries of the member nations. The task of this committee is to coordinate the views of the

individual nations to form a common European policy.

The most important issues are taken up at the foreign ministers' meeting, at which the countries' foreign ministers and the president of the EC Commission meet frequently on a formal or informal basis.

The European Council (not to be confused with the Council of Europe, which also includes countries outside the EC) meets three times each year and consists of the heads of state or government of the member nations, the foreign ministers, the president of the commission, and the member of the commission who is responsible for relations between the EC and other countries. Both foreign policy questions and internal EC issues are discussed at these meetings.

Working groups are also appointed that study the most important individual foreign policy questions related to the EC.

Norway's ties to this apparatus remain modest. For example, we have not achieved observer status or any formal influence. Agreement has been reached, however, on consultations at the senior official level between Norway and EPS before and after meetings of the political committee. This would be done through our embassy in Brussels and it will enable Norway to become familiar with the most important issues on the agenda and make our national views known. There are also plans to hold foreign ministers' meetings between Norway and the EC prior to EPS foreign ministers' meetings with follow-up contacts if needed.

During negotiations Norway has represented itself as a special case among countries outside the EC, in part because of our NATO membership and important strategic location and in part because of our oil. The Foreign Ministry maintains that Norway's position within NATO calls for closer ties to EPS than those established between EPS and neutral European countries. Norway's position in the Western alliance should mean that we do not wish to be grouped together with these countries, according to the Foreign Ministry.

Of course, our energy sources strengthen our position in negotiations with the EC, which has a large oil and gas deficit. If Norway wishes, it could become the largest supplier of oil and gas to the EC. Reliability and promptness are other qualities Norway has to offer in this connection.

Some examples of coordinated EC policies on important international issues include Poland, Iran, Afghanistan, the peace effort in the Middle East, Zimbabwe and other areas of conflict in Africa, and the European Security Conference. In the near future the Geneva negotiations on mutual troop reductions between the Soviet Union and the United States will be of special significance for EC foreign policy experts. There will be serious consequences if these negotiations fail. In that case, the West German government will face troubled times, since next year the installation of new nuclear warheads is scheduled to begin in Germany--if the Russians and the Americans fail to reach an agreement. The Germans fear a wave of mass demonstrations and civil

disobedience as a result. The French and the British governments hold an entirely different view and want installation to begin as soon as possible if no agreement is reached between the superpowers.

Previously such matters would be reserved for NATO, as they still are on paper. In the future, however, they will be dealt with more and more within the EPS. Now Norway will be able to follow these issues, but only from the sidelines.

9336

CS0: 3108/73



## LABOR PARTY DISTRICT CONGRESS HITS U.S. FOREIGN POLICIES

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 1 Mar 82 p 4

[Article: "Sor-Trondelag AP: Norway Must React Against United States"]

[Text] In a unanimous statement, the Sor-Trondelag Labor Party district congress strongly criticized United States policy in El Salvador and Turkey. At the same time, concern was expressed for events in Poland.

The statement stresses that it is the duty of Norway as a member of NATO to react when economic and military aid from the United States to the military junta in El Salvador makes possible the genocide being witnessed today.

"The systematic and brutal suppression of human rights in that country is a disgrace to the entire Western military alliance and a serious burden to NATO solidarity," according to the statement.

The Sor-Trondelag Labor Party said that the United States, with its condemnation of the military dictatorship in Poland and its support to the military dictatorships in El Salvador and Turkey is applying a double set of morals that is damaging to the credibility of United States policy.

In the resolution the Sor-Trondelag Labor Party regrets the lukewarm relations between the Norwegian government and the military dictatorship in Turkey.

In a statement on the domestic political situation the Sor-Trondelag Labor Party takes exception to the housing policy of the Conservative Party government and to the signals indicating possible changes in the agricultural policy.

9336

CSO: 3108/73

## FORCES COMMANDER SUTELA DISCUSSES SECURITY SITUATION

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 2 Mar 82 p 3

[Article: "Sutela on International Situation: 'Uncertainty Is Here to Stay'"]

[Text] Armed Forces commander, Gen Lauri Sutela, believes that the uncertainty in international affairs will continue. At the inauguration of the 84th National Defense Course in Helsinki on Monday, Sutela said that the factors that have created uncertainty are not anomalous situations that will quickly pass, rather that they are here to stay.

Sutela went on to say that discussions on arms limitation have run into serious difficulties and that they are more inclined than before to seek security through armament instead of arms limitation.

Due to international developments, the Nordic countries too have become involved in the international situation dominated by the big powers. Sutela pointed out that the influence of military alliances extends to the Nordic area "whether we like it or not."

Sutela said, however, that Finnish security is not entirely a consequence of the balance-of-power politics that prevails about us. A great deal depends on how Finland adapts its security policy actions to this situation. He said that our ability to defend ourselves should be credible and outsiders should be able to rely on it too.

"If the international situation changes in a more uncertain direction, we should pay special attention to keeping that other cornerstone of our security policy, our defense policy, firm as well. While the fact that foreign policy occupies first place in Finland's security policy is indisputable, it is expected of our country's political leaders that they also exercise considerable responsibility in preserving a credible defense capability," Sutela said.

Sutela said that he noted with gratification the new president of the republic, Mauno Koivisto's, words at the opening session of Parliament: "Finland too has to concern itself with the universal credibility of its own security policy."

The new defense minister, Juhani Saukkonen (Center Party), said that it is important for Finland to be able to in future as well cooperate in preserving the Nordic

countries' firm security policy arrangement. In his opinion, we should also in future see to it that it is maintained for a long time to come in the domains of both foreign policy and national defense.

Saukkonen also hoped that the Third Parliamentary Defense Committee's recommendations could be carried out. He furthermore noted that falling behind in defense funding is inevitable reducing credibility in our security policy.

In his talk, Saukkonen also discussed the possibilities of the Armed Forces' easing our country's difficult employment situation. He said that the Armed Forces has ready-made jobs to offer several thousand persons after only a short training period.

The defense minister is still pushing for passage of preparedness legislation. "This is of primary importance so that we can really eliminate various exceptional circumstances that persist between normal situations and an actual state of war, these having to do with deficiencies in our laws," Saukkonen argued.

11,466

CSO: 3107/87

## 1982 FLEET RECEIVES COMBAT, TRANSPORT SHIP DELIVERIES, ORDERS

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Feb 82 pp 162-163

[Article by Edouard de Cassius: "Development of the Fleet in 1982"]

[Text] Development of the Fleet in 1982

In 1982, 14 ships will be delivered to the French Navy, while 8 units will be decommissioned.

The deliveries involve the following:

1 nuclear attack submarine: the "Rubis."

1 antisubmarine corvette: the "Montcalm."

4 A69-class destroyers ["avisos"]: "Commandant L'Herminier," "Commandant Blaison," "Enseigne de Vaisseau Jacoubet," "Commandant Ducuing."

2 minehunters: "Eridan," "Cassiopee."

1 underway replenishment tanker: "Var."

1 public service trawler for southern-hemisphere lands.

4 training ships: "Leopard," "Panthere," "Jaguar," "Lynx."

Also 11 Super Etendard aircraft and 11 Xingu training aircraft will be delivered to Naval Aviation.

Ships decommissioned involve the following:

2 diesel attack submarines: "Marsouin," "Argonaute."

1 missile-launching ship: the squadron escort ship [destroyer] "Bouvet."

3 coastal minesweepers: "Lobelia," "Mimosa," "Eglantine."

1 patrol craft: "Altair."

1 oceanographic ship: "Origny."

The policy on new construction for the fleet, carried out firmly for several years now, is bearing its fruit in the industrial field, and the appropriations inserted in the 1982 budget (59.6 percent of Title V, 31.2 percent of the total budget) make it possible to cover expenditures caused by the 27 ships on the building ways at present.

The number of combatant ships that have not exceeded half their life is increasing and expresses the outlay made (17 percent in 1976 and 38 percent in 1982).

The 1982 budget also makes it possible to order 12 ships:

One nuclear attack submarine.

Two antisubmarine corvettes.

Two minehunters.

Two Super Patra.

Two 400-ton public service ships.

Two oceanographic ships.

One minewarfare experimentation ship.

The increase in program authorizations in the 1982 budget in comparison with the 1981 budget is only 12.2 percent and is slightly lower than the increase in the Defense budget (12.5 percent).

This increase may cause some concern, if it is not rectified in 1982, because some important programs are to be initiated:

Aircraft carriers.

Antiaircraft corvettes.

Public service ships from 900 to 2,000 tons.

The 1982 budget, which is the last one under the 1979-1982 programing law, prepares for transition with the new 1984-1988 programing law announced by the government. Because of its new constructions, the Navy is paying much attention to this transition whose approval will not be felt until the long term and it will be applied to the overall planning for replacement of units.

10,042

CSO: 3100/377

## MANPOWER, EQUIPMENT EXPENDITURES FOR 1982 NAVAL BUDGET

Paris LA NOUVELLE REVUE MARITIME in French Feb 82 pp 6-16

[Article by Jean Laabayle-Couhat: "The 1982 Navy Budget"]

[Text] A Turning-point Budget

The 1982 Defense budget amounts to 122,835 million francs, compared with 104,443 in 1981, in payment appropriations (CP), excluding pensions. These are the funds available to the Armed Forces in 1982. Their increase in comparison with the previous year, or 17.6 percent, is less than the increase in the state's civilian budgets, which were increased sharply (+29.3 percent), in order to meet the new priorities desired by the government.

This budget represents 3.895 percent of the PIBm (Gross Domestic Mercantile Product), a percentage slightly lower than the percentage that was to be attained this year and that will not be attained, finally, until 1983 (3.94 percent), provided it is desired to attain the objectives scheduled in the 1982 budget. It comes at a turning point period. The last one in the 1977-1982 programming law, its objective, like the one that will be proposed next year, is to make up for the delays that have occurred in carrying it out, before the new 1984-1988 programming law announced by the government.

In percentage, it is organized as follows, in comparison with the budget of the other Armed Forces and the common section:

Common section: 25.4.  
Air Force section: 21.1.  
Army section: 26.6.  
Navy section: 17.8.  
Gendarmerie section: 8.9.

In this Defense budget, equipment expenditures increase faster than operating expenditures, as is shown by the following distribution in million francs of the CP between titles III and V:



Title	1981	1982	Increase
Title V (equipment)	47,685	56,345	+18.16%
Title III (operation)	56,758	66,490	+17.15%
Total	104,443	122,835	+17.60%

In investment, the nuclear share increases to 16,189 million francs in CP, representing 29.35 percent of Title V, compared with 13,443 million francs in 1981 (28.7 percent). In AP (payment authorizations), 19,287 million francs are budgeted, compared with 15,825 million francs approved last year, representing a 27.87-percent increase. These sizable amounts show very well the government's desire to continue its predecessors' defense policy. In these expenditures, the Strategic Naval Force (FOST) alone will absorb 5,958 million francs in payment appropriations (7,310 million francs in AP). These CP include the Navy allocation pertaining to strategic submarines (SNLE [Missile Launching Nuclear Submarine]), or 2,665 million francs, which will be analyzed below, and 3,283 million francs for missiles, financed by the common section.

#### The Navy Favored

The Navy budget for 1982 shows a 19.4-percent increase in comparison with the budget for the previous fiscal year. This percentage is higher than the percentage for the entire Defense budget, without equaling, however, the common section budget (+19.9 percent). Therefore, the Navy will be favored slightly, in 1982, with regard to other two branches. As must be observed, moreover, this was the case up to now during the entire 1977-1982 programming. But since, during that period, it started building the SNLE "L'Inflexible" not provided for in the budget, the evolution of various economic factors reduced its purchasing power originally estimated at around 6 percent.

The 21,952 million francs for CP allocated to it in 1982 are broken down as follows:

10,462 million francs for operation (Title III).  
11,490 million francs for capital expenditures (Title V).

#### Operation

The most important items under Title III (operation) pertain to:

Pay.  
Scheduled maintenance of Naval Aviation.  
Scheduled maintenance of the fleet.  
Fuels.

#### Pay

Pay absorbs 5,082.23 million francs of the CP, compared with 4,332.37 million francs last year, representing a 17-percent increase in comparison with 1981 allocation and 48.57 percent of Title III. This increase in pay is due, on

the one hand, to the scheduled increase in the salary of state employees, to the increase in the daily subsistence allowance of draftees and to the creation of 408 additional billets. These appropriations will make it possible to maintain a personnel force budgetarily fixed at 68,386 military broken down as follows:

a. Active, including female personnel:

4,497 officers.

45,878 nonofficers.

b. Draftees

18,009 officer candidates, noncommissioned officers, enlisted men and women volunteers.

Included in this personnel force is Naval Aviation personnel, or about 12,000 men, including 1,500 flight personnel. On the other hand, they do not include flag officers, 160 students in the Navy's specialized schools and about 1,000 permanent shore patrolmen.

The creation of 408 additional billets starts implementation of a plan providing for a personnel increase of about 5,000 men, so that it can perform the missions incumbent on it and especially new missions (public service) without major difficulties. It must be pointed out, however, that these 408 billets are actually reduced to 347, because 61 of them already existed. Moreover, as Lejeune, reporter-adviser on the Navy budget in the Senate, has pointed out: "Like last year, the problem of understaffing remains entirely unsolved, because nothing will be changed in this connection in 1982. It must be noted, in fact, that the proportion of officers in the Navy is only 8 percent, compared with 12 percent and even 13 percent in the leading foreign navies."

Moreover, the proportion between noncommissioned officers and active-duty seamen is much lower than the one found in the other two branches between noncommissioned officers and enlisted men. It was as follows in 1980:

Branch	Noncommissioned officers	Enlisted men
Army	64%	36%
Air Force	79%	21%
Navy	62.5%	37.5%

The numerical personnel shortage is, in fact, one of the problems, and perhaps the principal problem, that the Navy will have to solve during the next few years. As Admiral Lannuzel points out in his New Year message: "It is a historical fact that its overall authorized strength has not varied since 1965 in spite of two very appreciable evolutions: on the one hand, the increasing complexity of equipment put in service, which, by increasing considerably instruction and training expenditures, decreases the number of personnel usable in the forces; on the other hand, the modifications in the number and nature of the missions, which, for example, have led to the establishment

of the FOST with its 3,500 men. Or again the assumption of protection of our bases, formerly handled by the Army. This personnel shortage has resulted in the need, on some ships, to set up a port and starboard watch system, representing 12-hour working days." On the other hand and unfortunately, for the second consecutive year, measures improving the humping of noncommissioned officers have not been obtained.

#### Scheduled Maintenance of Naval Aviation

It is allocated 417.71 million francs, compared with 359.71 million francs in 1981, or an increase of 58 million francs, that is to say 16 percent. In view of monetary erosion, these CP are barely greater than in the previous fiscal year. Therefore, it will be necessary to follow with special attention the programs for maintenance of material, in order to stay within the limit of these appropriations.

#### Naval Means (as of 1 January 1982)

Type	Number	Tonnage
Strategic Naval Force		
SNLE	5	37,500
Combatant Ships		
Attack submarines	20	18,700
Aircraft carriers	3	54,000
Antiaircraft ships	6	26,930
Antisubmarine ships	13	43,920
Frigates	20	27,750
Patrol craft	25	6,235
Antimine ships	23	12,200
Total combatant ships	110	189,735
Support Ships		
Oilers, Supply ships, Logistic Support ships	10	46,580
Troop Transport and Landing ships	9	21,890
Miscellaneous, hydroplanes, EDIC [landing craft], RHM [expansion unknown]	26	14,490
Total support ships	45	82,960
Overall total, excluding FOST	155	272,695

#### Scheduled Maintenance of the Fleet

This item includes maintenance of ships, munitions and equipment. 2,172 million francs will be allocated, compared with 1,895.6 million francs last year, representing a 14.5-percent increase. These allotments will be sufficient owing to the placing of new ships in service, requiring less work than the older ships. The oldest ones have already been decommissioned (17 in 1981). Others will be decommissioned this year, including the fleet escort ship "Bouvet," as new ships come into the fleet. In 1981, two new ships joined the fleet, the corvette "Dupleix" and the frigate "Premier Maitre L'Her." On the other hand, 1982 will be a sumptuous year for our fleet. In fact the following ships will be delivered: the nuclear attack submarine "Rubis," the C70 antisubmarine corvette "Montcalm," the C69 frigates "Commandant

L'Herminier," "Commandant Blaison," "Commandant Ducuing," and "Enseigne de Vaisseau Jacoubet," the tripartite [Belgium, France, Netherlands] mine hunters "Eridan," "Cassiopee," and the third one in this series, the support tanker "Var," the four training ships "Leopard," "Panthere," "Jaguar" and "Lynx." Acquisition of a civilian trawler to be converted into a patrol craft for the southern seas is also scheduled. The Navy is investigating the market, because the owner of the trawler "Islande," who was interested at one time in these purchases, finally refused to sell his ship to the Navy. In 1982, 22,300 tons of new ships will join the fleet. This will contribute to its rejuvenation.

#### Combat Aircraft (as of 1 January 1982)

Type	Number	
	Total	On line
<hr/>		
Shipboard aircraft		
Crusader	29	16
Etendard IV-P	14	8
Super Etendard	56	46
Alize Mod	8	8
Total	107	78
Sea patrol		
Atlantic Nouvelle Generation	0	0
Atlantic	34	34
Neptune	6	6
Total	40	40
Helicopters		
Super Frelon	18	18
Lynx WG 13	24	24
Total	42	42
Total combat aircraft	189	160
Support, Training Aircraft	213	191

#### Fuel

The 1982 allocation for fuel amounts to 909 million francs, or 230.8 million francs more than in 1981, including 323 million francs for Naval Aviation (+73 million francs). This item increases 34 percent, which should compensate for foreseeable price rises. These allocations are for an average annual activity of 90 days at sea for all the fleet ships (99 for combatant ships and 89 for logistic ships). With regard to Naval Aviation, the allocation should make it possible to increase to 95,000 flying hours for all aircraft, or roughly 20 hours of flying time for a shipboard pilot. Speaking on the whole, our Navy's activity will be less than the activity of the United States Navy (120 to 130 days at sea) and of the Royal Navy (105 to 115 days). It will be, on the other hand, far greater than the activity of the Soviet Navy, if it continues to sail little in 1982, as was the case in previous years (50 to 60 days).

## Capital Expenditures

If capital expenditures are now examined, the 1982 budget provides 11,490 million francs in CP for them, compared with 9,460 million francs in 1981, or an increase of 2,030 million francs (+21.5 percent), and 13,490.25 million francs in program authorizations, compared with 12,020 million francs in the previous budget (+12.28%). The most important items under this heading pertain to the following:

### Ammunition and Missiles

960 million francs in CP and 1,195 million francs in AP will be allocated to them. That will make it possible to finance new amounts of missiles: naval Crotale, MM 28, MM 40, L5 and L7 torpedoes, and so on.

### Technical Studies on Armament and Prototypes

These studies are conducted by the DTCN [Directorate of Naval Construction], DTEn [Missile Technology Directorate] and DTCA [Directorate for Technical Aeronautical Construction]. The CP allocated to them amount to 1,335 million francs, compared with 1,182 million francs in 1981 and the AP amount to 1,405 million francs (1,261.5 million francs in 1981). These allocations will be used for the following:

Data processing.

New radars (J11 and V15).

Submarine detection and especially passive submarine detection (development of the towed ETBF [expansion unknown] system).

Reduction of radiated noises.

Missiles: AM39, SM39, improvement of MM38, MM40, which is to equip frigates and avisos [small frigates], SATCP [short-range surface-to-air missile] (Sadral), improvement to the naval Crotale missile, and so on.

Studies pertaining to future ships of the fleet and especially nuclear aircraft carriers that are to replace the "Clemenceau" and the "Foch."

New General Atlantic [aircraft].

### Productions for Naval Aviation

They receive 1,555 million francs in CP, compared with 1,818 million francs the preceding year and 1,723 million francs in AP, while, in 1981, the AP amounted only to 1,205.5 million francs. The CP will make it possible to practically complete the Super Etendard program. Eleven will be delivered, in 1982, bringing the total of these aircraft up to 67 out of the 71 scheduled in programing. Eleven Xingu training aircraft out of a total of 16 scheduled will join the Training School for Multiengine Pilots in which they will replace the MD312. These Xingu were financed in 1980.

Production of five Guardian ocean surveillance aircraft intended for replacing obsolescent Neptune aircraft overseas is continuing. They will be delivered in 1983, but more likely in 1984.

No WG13 helicopter will join Naval Aviation in 1982.

The appreciable decrease in payment appropriations pertaining to Naval Aviation is explained by the fact that the Super Etendard program is practically completed. On the other hand, the sharp increase in AP (+517.5 million francs or 42.9 percent) anticipates production-line construction of the so-called New Generation Atlantic aircraft, for which 265 million francs are provided, and the initiation of a new light helicopter program for replacement of helicopters now in service like the Alouette III. 215 million francs are provided for this program.

#### New Construction

New construction receives 6,849 million francs in CP, compared with 4,893 million francs, representing a 39-percent increase in the amounts allocated to them and 8,250 million francs in AP (7,844 in 1981).

Here, what is intended for the FOST should be separated from what pertains to the other ship categories.

#### FOST

The FOST is allocated 2,665 million francs in CP, compared with 2,178.15 million francs in the preceding budget and 3,600 million francs in AP (2,754.15 million francs in 1981). A major unit in the deterrence forces, it is normal for nothing to be neglected for keeping it at the highest possible level. The CP and AP allocated for 1982 will be devoted to a continuation of construction of "L'Inflexible" (it will be launched next spring), but also to research, to operation, to drydocking, to infrastructure and to maintenance of 5 SNLE in service. It should be pointed out, in this connection, that financing of the missiles that they use and of studies involving them comes under the common section and not under the Navy budget. 3,293 million francs are allocated to them in the common section. Development of the M4 missile, which is to be installed on "L'Inflexible," then subsequently on the previous SNLE, with the exception, perhaps, of the "Redoutable," is continuing. The first batch will be delivered in 1985, at the time when "L'Inflexible" will join the fleet. The next batches will be delivered every two years, in accordance with the calendar of scheduled refittings, until our Strategic Naval Force has around 400 warheads, in 1991. Studies have been undertaken pertaining to the future M5 with so-called "spinning" warheads at the end of the trajectory. This M5 might equip the seventh SNLE that the president of the Republic has decided to build. This submarine will not be operational until 1994, as the minister of Defense has stated to the Senate. It will have considerably increased performance in comparison with the performance of "L'Inflexible," especially with regard to submersion, silence, armament and equipment. It will be the prototype of a new generation of SNLE, very different from the previous series of which "L'Inflexible" is the last and the most improved.



## Other Ships

With regard to other ship categories, the situation is as follows:

	1981		1982	
	CP	AP	CP	AP
New construction	2,050	4,225	3,429	3,714
Major refitting and modernization	480	690	600	750
Tenders	70	85	75	86
Public service ships	15	90	80	100
Total	2,615	5,090	4,184	4,650

As can be seen, although the CP pertaining to new construction show a spectacular 1,379-million-franc (+60.5 percent) increase, which is going to make it possible to accelerate the program in progress, in accordance with the government's desire, the situation is the opposite with regard to program authorizations, which are decreased by 511 million francs in comparison with the AP allocated last year. This situation is causing some concern, because, if it should be prolonged, it would risk delaying, however well started, renovation of our traditional combatant and logistic forces.

However that may be, these CP and AP will make the following possible:

### Continuation of Construction in Progress

It is a question of ships that will go in service in 1982 and whose list was given above, plus the following units whose construction was approved in previous budgets:

The SNA [Nuclear Attack Submarine] "Saphir" and number 3 and 4. The keel of the first two section of Number 3 was laid on 21 September 1981, at Cherbourg.

The type C70 antisubmarine corvettes "Jean de Vienne" (launched on 7 November 1981) and numbers 5 and 6, now being prefabricated at Brest.

The type C70 antiaircraft corvettes numbers 1 and 2. One of them is being prefabricated ashore at Lorient. It will be assembled in the large dock of the shipyard next June. It will use the Tartar system of the "Bouvet," which was decommissioned last 1 January. This system, in excellent condition, will be brought up to the most recent United States Navy standard after salvaging. It should be noted that these corvettes will now have, in place of the 100-millimeter CA [AA gun] turret located on the stern, a hangar for a light helicopter and two Sadral short-range surface-to-air systems. It is a wise decision, all the more so, because it seemed surprising that a ship of this size should not be equipped like all similar recent foreign ships with a permanent onboard helicopter.

Tripartite mine hunters numbers 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8.

Type A69 aircraft numbers 16 and 17.

Underway replenishment tanker number 4. Like the "Var," which will join the fleet this year, it will be equipped to accommodate a maritime zone commander or the logistics headquarters of a naval force commander.

The Super Patra numbers 1, 2, 3 and 4.

The SP 400 public service patrol craft numbers 1 and 2.

Leopard class training ships numbers 5, 6, 7 and 8.

Batral class transports numbers 3 and 4. The first one was launched last 27 November.

#### To Be Ordered

1 Rubis class nuclear attack submarine: number 5 and last of this series.

2 C70 type antisubmarine corvettes: numbers 7 and 8 in the series. These two ships do not appear on the 1977-1982 programing, which provided only for six units of this type. At the end of the century, these fine corvettes will be the mainstay in our squadrons. They will undoubtedly be divided into two divisions of four ships each. The first one will be established during the first half of this year, when the "Montcalm" will go to the Mediterranean, after its reliability trial. In addition to this ship, the first division will include the "Georges Leygues" and the "Dupleix," then, later, the "Jean de Vienne."

Two tripartite mine hunders: numbers 9 and 10.

Two Super Patra: numbers 5 and 6.

Two SP400 patrol craft: numbers 3 and 4.

Two type BH2 800-ton oceanographic ships. Construction of the BH1 was rejected. Four BH2 will be built altogether.

One minewarfare experiment ship for the Minewarfare Research, Instruction and Training Center.

This naval group amounts to 14,600 tons.

In addition, a sum of 30 million francs has been provided, under the heading of new construction, for research on nuclear boilers for the future aircraft carriers. It is settled that, until there is another order, the keel of the first one will be laid at Brest in 1983.

The CP and AP pertaining to major refittings and modernizations involve primarily updating electronic equipment and weapons, like the Mazurca--now equipping the cruiser "Colbert" and the frigates "Duquesne" and "Suffren"--on certain ships.

## An Adequate Budget

No one seems better authorized to comment on this Navy budget and to draw the conclusion from it than Admiral Lannuzel, the Navy chief of staff. The following is what he stated in this connection in the message addressed to the naval personnel at the beginning of the new year: "The payment appropriations granted to the Navy for 1982 are satisfactory, while the economic situation is difficult. They will make it possible to continue making the pattern for the 'Navy of the Year 2000.' But this effort must be continued year after year, because it is so true that construction of a navy is a matter of continuity, will and tenacity. That is why, in the 1982 Navy budget, the small amount of program authorizations, with an increase of only 12.2 percent in comparison with 1981, that is to say less than the rise in prices, is cause for concern. Now, program authorization is the guarantee of the future. The smallness of the program authorizations will have no 'irreversible' consequence, because it is situational and tied only to 1982. My most fervent wish is to see them go up again to a level compatible with the objectives of the Navy of the Year 2000."

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## BRIEFS

NEW MINE HUNTER TESTED--The "Eridan," prototype of the tripartite [Belgium, France, Netherlands] mine hunters, has taken on stores for trials at Lorient. Built in collaboration with the Belgian and Netherlands navies on a joint military program, 15 units of this class are to be constructed in France and in the Netherlands. The Belgian Navy, in turn, has ordered 10 units. The hulls, made of glass reinforced plastic composite, are built by each of the three countries, but the onboard equipment, identical for the three navies, is furnished by companies in the three countries in accordance with the following distribution: France furnishes the weapon system and the gas turbines; the Netherlands, the main propulsion and the diesels; Belgium, the heavy electrical equipment, the active rudders and the steering equipment. The second French mine hunter, named the "Eassiopee," is to take on stores for trials during the first half of 1982. [Text] [Paris LA NOUVELLE REVUE MARITIME in French Feb 82 p 116] 10042

TRANSPORT SHIP LAUNCHED--A light transport ship was launched on 27 November 1981 at the Normandy Shipyards, at Grand Quevilly. It is the first of two identical units ordered from those shipyards by the French Navy. The following are its characteristics: displacement, (approximately) 1,400 tons full load; dimensions, 80 X 13 X 2.4 (hollow) meters; propulsion, 2 SA7M diesels, 2 variable-pitch screws, 3,600 horsepower (2,647 kilowatts); maximum speed, 16 knots (13 cruising); armament, 2 40-millimeter antiaircraft guns, 1 81-millimeter mortar, 2 12.7-millimeter machineguns. The DTCN [Directorate of Naval Construction] Brest built the prototype of these light transport ships, the "Champlain" and its sister ship "Francis Garnier," in 1974. These ships are equipped with a bow door making it possible to embark and land vehicles on the beach. These vehicles can be stored on the deck or in the hangar. A helicopter landing platform is provided on the stern. In addition to a crew of 47 persons, the facilities make it possible to accommodate an infantry company of the intervention type complete with weapons, equipment and vehicles. The total number of onboard personnel then is 227 men. The Normandy Shipyards have built for Morocco (three ships) and for Ivory Coast (1 ship) units of the same dimensions, but with a reinforced structure to hold 40-ton tanks. Chile is also building two units very similar to the "Champlain": the "Rancagua" and the "Maipo." The new Batral-type ships for the French Navy will have the benefit of more roomy accommodations and various improvements pertaining primarily to maintenance and electricity production facilities. The Normandy Shipyards have been assigned responsibility for appropriate adaptation studies. [Text] [Paris LA NOUVELLE REVUE MARITIME in French Feb 82 pp 116-117] 10042

TEST SHIP LAUNCHES MISSILE--An MM40 missile, fired from the test ship "Ile d'Oleron," hit the target on the hull of the former fast escort ship "Le Basque," located at a distance of 65 kilometers. This success validates this transhorizon weapon system installed on the corvette "Montcalm" and it is scheduled for the ships being completed or under construction: antiaircraft and antisubmarine corvette, A69 frigates. [Text] [Paris LA NOUVELLE REVUE MARITIME in French Feb 82 p 117] 10042

CHEMICAL WEAPONS DETERRENT--The Special Weapons Military School in Grenoble is going to receive sizable appropriations and increased means for developing counterattack weapons in case of chemical-biological warfare. [Text] [Paris LE POINT in French 8-14 Feb 82 p 29] 10042

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## CHEVENEMENT ON SPACE GOALS, MILITARY, CIVILIAN APPLICATIONS

Paris AVIATION MAGAZINE INTERNATIONAL in French 1-14 Mar 82 pp 22-23

[Interview with Minister of State for Scientific Research and Technology Jean-Pierre Chevenement by Patrice Prevot]

[Text] The Europeans have officially decided to undertake development of the Ariane 4 launcher, to strengthen their competitiveness, in the coming years, in the market for space-transport facilities. France has played a leading role in the launching of this program. It is an opportunity for us to get up to date, with Minister of State for Scientific Research and Technology Jean-Pierre Chevenement, on the policy that France will carry out in the space domain in the coming years. An opportunity also to consider the Europeans' concerns regarding definition of the launcher that is to succeed Ariane 4 and thus expand European competitiveness. Finally, through an inquiry by our correspondent in Washington, an opportunity to get a better idea of the competitive situation between Americans and Europeans in the satellite-launcher field.

[Question] With the objective of raising national research expenditures to 2.5 percent of Gross Domestic Product--as against barely 2 percent at present--as of 1985, the government has set its ambitions on this plan. On both the practical and the economic level, what will be the impact of this effort on French space activity--an activity from which there should be a great deal of technological fallout?

[Answer] This very considerable increase in the national expenditures devoted to research will make it possible to go on with the French space program to a high level. The Ariane family can be developed. The performance levels of the present launcher can be doubled in 1985, with the arrival of Ariane 4; furthermore, the cost of transport in orbit will be notably reduced.

As regards satellites, Spot will provide a real operational images service that will be used for better management of earth resources, in the areas of agriculture and fishing, for example.

Television received directly from satellites by means of either individual antennas or antennas common to a building or a village is becoming a reality.



We will therefore be in a position, on the one hand, to develop new technologies with high performance and competitive with those of the big space nations, and on the other hand, to finance concrete uses that will have considerable economic and cultural consequences.

[Question] On a general level, this objective (reaching 2.5 percent of GDP in 1985) will result in a very large investment. You hope to bring a good number of enterprises into this effort. As regards the space effort, who will finance it?

[Answer] There are, in effect, two kinds of investments: those that are necessary for development of the new technologies for the satellites and the launchers, the main part of whose financing has to be ensured by the state (but I hope that the national-sector industrialists will themselves be more anxious than in the past to provide self-financing which, in liaison with us, will make it possible to prepare well for the future); and those that are necessary for assembly-line production or production for export and that can be financed, as is normal, by the enterprises themselves.

[Question] In a field as advanced, on the technological level, as space, the military research has had fallout on civilian activities. What types of links between the civilian and military sectors would you consider it desirable to strengthen, with a view to optimizing the means of research?

[Answer] Space activities in France are in the civilian domain. But technical links have always existed with the military sector, especially with regard to launchers. It is important, of course, to make sure that the means of research are harmonized. It is perhaps especially advisable for the civilians and the military to prepare together for the future uses of space. We must have a common forward-looking view of the strategic uses of space. Economy, culture, national identity and defense are entirely interlinked. Twenty or 30 years from now, a good many of their applications will be dependent on the space facilities.

[Question] Among your future objectives there is also the concern to launch some big technological programs. But the cost of such programs is growing all the time. This means that implementation of them will in most cases have to involve cooperation. What are the broad outlines of the policy that you envision establishing in this regard?

[Answer] I hope effectively to develop a certain number of big mobilizing programs which for France correspond to today's big stakes. They involve in particular robotics, biotechnologies, the microcomputer field, new energy forms and rational use of energy. These programs will be the first of our priorities. Their growth will have to be very rapid, and the state's effort, at least in giving them their first impulse, will be decisive. These objectives are entirely comparable to those that France set for itself after the war in the nuclear field, or in the 1960's with space, aeronautics and data-processing.

The effort is a national one first of all. But certain of these themes lend themselves to cooperation, especially at the European level. We are very open

to them, of course. Ariane has proved that well-structured European cooperation can be effective. The Airbus program likewise. Thus, in the coming years, and to return to the subject of the space field in particular, France does indeed intend to continue to play the leading role that it has had in the building of a competitive European aerospace industry.

[Question] The French government wants to take such action that in 1990, the French electronics industry will rank No 3 in the world. The space industry should consume high-integration components. How is France's independence in this area to be ensured?

[Answer] We are under a handicap in the matter of components. We must gradually free ourselves of it. I consider that an important technical research effort should be devoted to this subject. We will achieve it in particular through the budget of the CNES [National Center for Space Studies], which, starting this year, has been increased quite considerably for this type of activity. More specifically, a microelectronics plan is being prepared--a plan which furthermore will require sizable financial means, on the order of several billion francs in the next 5 years. The ministries of Defense, Industry and Posts & Telegraph will of course be actively involved in this plan, in addition to the Ministry of Scientific Research and Technology.

[Question] Job-creation is one of your concerns. But the space industry is an industry of "people in white coats." Actually, hundreds of engineers capable of going rapidly into action in such a field are not trained at the snap of a finger. In your opinion, can this industry be a creator of jobs, and if so, to what extent?

[Answer] The space industry in itself does not create a very large number of jobs. There are 7,000 persons working in it today. We can certainly increase this figure by a few thousand. With regard to highly skilled job positions, this is an attractive gain. But the most important thing, in quantitative terms, is the very large number of jobs that can be created indirectly. Space means television, the telephone, telex connections, long-distance transmission of newspapers, etc--all activities that require ground installations, involving markets creating large numbers of jobs. Our industry has to be ready to satisfy these markets induced by the development of space technologies.

[Question] You hope that consultation will be enlarged, as regards the big technological options. Don't you fear that relatively cumbersome structures will thus be set up (Supreme Council on Research, regional advisory committees, etc) that will impede the decision-making processes?

[Answer] Consultation and coordination in the matter of technological choices are indispensable, as they are in the other sectors of the country's economic and social life. They are not a constraint. They are not contradictory to effectiveness. Quite to the contrary, they are the indispensable condition for it. The time devoted to them is very quickly gained back when decisions have to be made and things have to be put into practice. The partners in research--trade unions, industrialists, users--need to be involved in its development. This is not an impediment, it is a help.

I believe there is no better illustration of this than the national conference on research that ended recently. Did it impede the decision-making process? Quite to the contrary: we are now finally ready, in a few weeks, to present to the nation's elected representatives a bill that will provide French research and technology with the guarantees, the orientations, the choices and the means it will need for several years.

[Question] In the area of exports, the financing parameter is increasingly decisive. The French industrialists are therefore confronted with a number of problems in this regard. Do you envision providing complementary new approaches to the existing procedures?

[Answer] Exportation, especially in the space field, should be warmly encouraged. We will do so, of course, in conformity with our international commitments.

[Question] In October, the government asked the MATRA [Mechanics, Aviation and Traction Co] company to keep out of a contract (Brazilsat) in which, in particular, it found itself in competition with Aerospatiale. Does this decision prefigure the main trends of an industrial policy that you envision for the longer term?

[Answer] The Brazilians informed us that they wanted a single bid. After a thorough examination of the dossiers, we proposed to them the best product in function of their needs. This does not in any way prefigure a general rule. The important thing in exportation is to win. To be the best and the least expensive--that is the objective. When a satellite is involved, you can imagine that this is not an easy matter. In one case, one industrialist or another, with his international alliances, will be in the best position. In another case, another one, leading a European consortium, will be the best.

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